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C.S. Lewis and the
Euthyphro Dilemma
The “Euthyphro Dilemma”
is typically posed by asking: Are certain actions good because God commands
them or does God command them because they are good? Grasping the first
horn is alleged to commit one to thinking God’s commands objectionably
arbitrary and to empty such phrases as “God is good” of all content.
Alternatively, grasping the second horn is thought to make morality
anterior to God, and thus to make God subject to something external to
himself, which seems incompatible with traditional theism. Arguing for the
inadequacy of certain standard responses to this dilemma, I defend a modified
version of Lewis’ own position. According to this position, morality is
rooted in God’s essential nature. An older version of this piece is
available here.
C.S. Lewis and the
Possibility of Miracles
In his writings on
miracles, Lewis argued persuasively for the possibility
of miracles. I argue
that Lewis’s approach to the definition and, therein, the possibility of
miracles is exemplary. In the process of this argument I explore the topic of
“The Laws of Nature” (another topic about which Lewis has a lot to say).
After drawing from the analysis of laws of nature the conclusion that
science cannot (via its “laws”) explain the existence of the universe,
Lewis offers a little noticed (and indeed rather tentative)
cosmological-type argument for the inadequacy of a materialistic
world-view.
C.S. Lewis, David
Hume and the Credibility of Miracles
Lewis also took on the
mighty David Hume an argued for the (in principle) credibility of miracles.
I contend that Lewis’ attack on Hume is, at best, incomplete, but that this
incompleteness can be remedied (in part by appeal to Chesterton.
C.S. Lewis and the
Freudian Critique of Religion
Lewis was well aware of
the Freudian critique of religion, and implicit and explicit in Lewis’s
work are several responses to that critique. Some of these responses, even
when taken individually, are sufficient to undermine Freud’s argument.
However, the most common criticism of the Freudian argument, one that can
be found in Lewis, is that it commits the “genetic fallacy”. But it is far
from clear what this fallacy is supposed to be and whether it is indeed a
fallacy. I argue that there is such a fallacy and that Freud does commit
it.
C.S. Lewis’ Argument
from Desire
Also bearing an
interesting relation to the Freudian critique of religion is Lewis’
“Argument from Desire.” Indeed, the argument’s first premise is obviously
similar to the basic premise of Freud’s reasoning and yet the conclusion is
diametrically opposed. In rough outline this argument runs: We have a
natural desire for God, but every natural desire has a correlating object
of desire, so … Something similar to this argument can be found in
Augustine and Pascal (and Plantinga) among others, but I have nowhere found
it so clearly stated as in Lewis. While the argument is probably not so
convincing as Lewis seemed to believe it to be, it is at least as
persuasive as many of the more traditional arguments for God and deserves
more attention than it has, hitherto, received.
Last Updated: 15th
March 2003
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