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H.M.S. MANXMAN

Life on Board Section

 Torpedo Damage

Manxman was torpedoed and severely damaged by U375 off Oran, Algeria. Four men were killed and a number injured. Repairs took until Apr 1945 to complete.

From the original records 1st Dec 1942:-

(This material is Crown copyright and may be viewed at the National Archive file ADM 267/32 see link page)

 MANXMAN.  Type of Ship "ABDIEL" Class Fast Minelayer. Completed 1941.

Principal dimensions:-   Length, extreme. 418 feet 0 inches. Breath, extreme. 40 feet 0 inches .Draught, mean . 14 feet 1 inch  Displacement. 3800 Tons.( Deep Condition )

NOTE: This report is based on those of the Commanding Officer and of  the Commodore Superintendent, Gibraltar.

I. Circumstances.

1. On 1st December, 1942, H.M.S. Manxman was on passage from Algiers to Gibraltar. The ship was carrying no mines, cargo or passengers, And was zig-zagging on a mean course of 284 degrees at a speed of 21 knots. Asdic watch was being kept, sweeping from Green 70 degrees to Red 70 degrees. W/T watch was being kept on Gibraltar broadcast and local Port wave. The full normal cruising watch was closed up
3. The ship was upright. The sea was calm and the weather fine. Depth of water 1400 fathoms.

II. Attack.

4. At 1702, when MANXMAN was in position 36 degrees 39 minutes North, 00 degrees 15 minutes East, about 71 miles north-east of Oran. A torpedo was observed to approach the ship and pass close astern from port to starboard, running shallow. This was followed about three seconds later by a second torpedo witch struck the ship on the port side. The explosion occurred abreast the engine room in the vicinity of station 119 causing the after end of the ship to lift violently.

5. The torpedoes may have been ether 21 inches diameter with a 660 lbs. warhead or 18 inches diameter with a 440 lbs. warhead. The smaller type of torpedo is known to be in use by Italian submarines.

III. Subsequent Events.

6. Immediately after the explosion, all lights failed and extensive flooding occurred. The ship at once assumed a list to starboard of 15 degrees which increased within a few minutes to 16 degrees. MANXMAN proceeded, gradually losing speed, for a distance of three cables and then stopped. She did not move subsequently under her own power. Draught forward decreased to 13 feet 0 inches and draught aft increased to 18 feet 5 inches port and 27 feet 2 inches starboard

To reduce the risk of further attack the whole armament was fired into the water at 1000 yards range whenever anything was heard, or thought to be heard. in the Asdic. Also, for three hours from dusk depth charges were dropped around the ship from the fast motor-boat in an attempt to create the impression in the submarine that destroyers had arrived on the scene. No further attack took place and at no time was the submarine definitely heard in the asdic, or scan.

At 2315, H.M.S. PATHFINDER arrived and prepared to take MANXMAN in tow for Oran. Later Captain D.6 arrived in H.M.S. ESKIMO. The tow commenced at 0015 2nd December and proceeded at 6 knots. Further vessels joined as Oran was approached.

On arrival at the port the ship was unable to pass over the wrecks in the harbour owing to her excessive draught so she was towed to Mers-EL-Kebir, about 4 miles to the West, where she arrived at 1300 and was berthed alongside the repair ship H.M.S. VINDICTIVE.

image torpedo damage to the hull 1

Approval was given for certain items to be removed from the ship in order to reduce draught so that the ship could be towed to Oran for temporary repairs. This decision was not put into effect owing to the congestion at the port. The necessary temporary repairs and strengthening to enable MANXMAN to be towed with safety to Gibraltar were carried out by VINDICTIVE.

Upon arrival at Gibraltar, MANXMAN was docked and the hole in the port side plated over. It was found necessary in order to bring the ship upright for towing to the U.K., to fit approximately 40 tons of iron ballast in the port side of the engine room to assist in counteracting the heel caused by loss of machinery, structure etc. On the port side. Oil fuel tank No.16, capacity 27 tons, was flooded with sea water to assist further in this respect.

IV. Flooding and Liquid Conditions.

7. Water entered the ship as follows:-

(a) Through the torpedo hole, flooding the engine and gearing rooms, thence aft by way of the port shaft gland at bulkhead 135, which was damaged, through the shaft tube to the port Plummer block and gland compartments. The access hatches to the gland compartments were closed at the time, but those to the Plummer block compartments were open for the hourly routine of taking temperatures. Action to close the hatches was taken before much water had entered the ward room or forward cabin flat. The hatches to both the port Plummer block and gland compartments eventually were unable to withstand the pressure built up beneath them and were forced from their seatings, in consequence of which compartments on the lower deck between stations 136 and 137, namely the ward room, lobbies and both cabin flats, became flooded.thumbnail image of torpedo damage to the hull 2
(b) Through the slightly leaking starboard shaft gland in bulkhead 135, into the starboard shaft tube, plumber block and gland compartment. The amount of water actually entering these compartments was very small and at no time were they anywhere near becoming completely flooded.

(c) From the flooded lobby on the lower deck, stations 142 to 147, into the pom-pom magazine in the hold by way of the magazine access scuttle at station 145. The scuttle was in position when the explosion occurred, but became distorted slightly.

(d) Through the scuppers, 3 No., in the starboard side of the mining trap space on the main deck, station 181 to stern, flooding that space to a maximum depth of 4 feet as the stern settled.

(e) on the starboard side of the main (i.e. mining) deck between stations 114 and 181, mainly by way of the starboard horizontal sliding door in bulkhead 181 which, although supposed to be watertight, failed to prevent water in the flooded mining trap space from seeping forward. A certain amount of water also penetrated to the main deck from the flooded engine room by way of the deep side frame at station 114 .

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