The desert is harsh; living conditions can be extremely uncomfortable; the desert can easily kill an unprepared soldier. The desert can pose a constant challenge to every soldier, and each must be physically, mentally, and professionally prepared to meet this challenge.
INTELLIGENCE
MANEUVER
FIRE SUPPORT
MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
COMMAND AND CONTROL
A. Background. Although GIs in World War II and Korea experienced their share of mine incidents, U.S. forces in Vietnam routinely faced the threat posed by mines and ambushes along their LOCs. Soldiers learned through trial and error to operate in this difficult environment. The experience produced many useful lessons learned. Commanders can take steps to significantly reduce mine losses. Appropriate tactics, combined with an aggressive training program for all personnel in mine warfare, proves to be an effective means of reducing casualties and equipment losses. To understand the threat, it is necessary to understand the enemy. His characteristics may include the following:
B. Countermine Tactics and Techniques
1. The Environment
Observations from 30 Dec 96 landmine incident:
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Mines are cheap, easy to manufacture and deploy, and provide an effective countermeasure to a modern force. Countering mines increases the logistics burden on a force – from the necessity to carry additional equipment and clearing personnel to the need for additional medical and mortuary services. Mines that wound rather than kill are more efficacious since every wounded soldier ties up many support and medical personnel. Mines also rob a track or wheeled force of its high-speed mobility and reduce the rate of movement to the speed of a cautious sapper. For these reasons, the problem of countering mines will remain a constant for units in Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the Russians buried and dropped about 10 to 12 million mines (some estimates are as high as 15 million) in the ground. “Minefields laid by the Soviets and the previous Afghan government forces were generally recorded and catalogued according to military procedures,” reported the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in 1994. “However, the vast majority of mines laid by the mujahideen were not recorded or laid to any specific pattern. Moreover, the records lost much of their significance as the many areas were fought over, and won and lost by both sides during the war.” All mine-clearing activity in Afghanistan has been suspended since 12 September 2001according to the U.N. Mine Action Program.
2. Types of Landmines
The following is a listing and brief description of the types of landmines likely to be encountered in your operational area.
3. Mine Activation Methods
4. Route Clearance Techniques
Although GIs in World War II and Korea experienced their share of mine incidents, U.S. forces in Vietnam routinely faced the threat posed by mines and ambushes along their LOCs. Soldiers learned through trial and error to operate in this difficult environment. The experience produced many useful lessons learned. Commanders can take steps to significantly reduce mine losses. Appropriate tactics, combined with an aggressive training program for all personnel in mine warfare, has proven to be an effective means of reducing casualties and equipment losses. Vietnam and Somalia demonstrated that route clearance must be treated as a combined arms combat operation to ensure success. Three proven techniques are available to clear a route: deliberate sweep, hasty sweep, and mine reconnaissance.
5. Mine Detection Techniques
| Lessons Learned Information Paper #13 (8 Feb 96)
Booby Trap Awareness, 31 Jan 96, 3-325 ABCT During a patrol of the zone of separation on 31 Jan 96, E Co, 3-325 ABCT encountered an unoccupied building. Before entering through the door of the building, the patrol carefully examined the building interior through a side window. The patrol was able to detect a wire leading from the interior door knob to what appeared to be hand grenades hanging over the door entrance. The patrol did not enter the building and reported the booby trap to the TOC. Upon later examination by EOD elements, it was determined that the apparent grenades were, in fact, only grenade fuses. The patrol demonstrated excellent booby trap awareness in their actions before entering the building: exercise caution, let EOD handle booby trap problems. |
Although it will not be possible to eliminate all casualties or equipment damage due to mines, there are steps that can be taken by commanders to reduce these incidents to a minimum. Appropriate tactics, combined with an aggressive training program for all personnel in mine warfare, is an effective means of reducing casualties and equipment losses.
6. Countermine Techniques and Protection
| Operational Vignette: A unit was making drawings of areas along the IEBL. Upon task completion, the convoy was oriented westward on Route Fanta, an improved road surface. To return to their base camp, the convoy had to turn around. They located an unimproved road that they could back into and turn around. As each vehicle turned around, it was forced to pass the vehicle following it on the improved surface road. The lead vehicle had little trouble passing the other three vehicles in the convoy. The second vehicle passed the third vehicle without any problems. However, as it was passing the trail vehicle in the convoy, it struck an anti-tank mine with the front tire of the vehicle. Engineers assessed that the FWF may have buried a mine under the improved surface road and the weight of the vehicle had caused the asphalt to sink, detonating the mine. The mine destroyed the entire front of the HMMWV. Soldiers in three of the HMMWVs sustained injuries. |
7. Reporting
| Lessons Learned Information Paper #17 (20 Feb 96)
Booby Traps, 17 Feb 96 On 17 Feb 96, a local civilian approached a C/3-4 CAV checkpoint and complained that an unoccupied, partially destroyed house had been booby trapped. C/3-4 CAV sent a patrol to investigate, and verified that there was one SPK M79 grenade rigged to the door of the house. The patrol did not attempt to clear the booby trap. They marked the house and the adjacent street with mine warning signs and reported the situation to their higher headquarters. The Former Warring Factions are required to remove mines and booby traps, not TFOR soldiers. C-3/4 CAV handled this situation correctly: They investigated the report of the booby trap; they reported what they found to their higher headquarters, Former Warring Factions, and the appropriate civilian authorities to warn displaced persons; they did not attempt to clear the booby trap themselves; and they marked the area to warn others. |
A spot report to the intelligence officer (S2) should be made immediately upon discovery or detonation of any mine. It is important that the spot report contain an accurate location (coordinates) of the incident. A written report containing all facts and commander's comments should be forwarded to the operations officer (S3) within 24 hours of the incident. If possible, sketches of the site showing where the mine was or a view of the buried mine should be included. Any recovered intelligence materials should be sent to the S2 in 24 hours.
8. Neutralization
When a mine or firing wires are detected, move all personnel except one man at least 100 meters from the area. He should immediately search for lead wires (all ordnance, including pressure fuzed AT mines can be rigged for command detonation). If found, they should be cut one at a time and shunted. One man attaches firing wire to wires leading into the road, being careful not to disturb the wire or pull it, then moves to a safe position and tries to fire the mine electrically. Remember that AP (antipersonnel) mines may be placed along the firing wire to protect it. If the mine does not detonate or demolition in place is unacceptable, sweep along the wire (one man) toward the road until the mine is located, and remove the mine from the MSR using an A-frame and grapnel. If unable to locate the mine, set a row of charges on the road and blow them all. After the mine has been detonated, carefully attach a piece of wire or rope to the end of the wires leading away from the road. If an armored vehicle is available, play out the wire or rope attached to the firing wires and pull by hand at a safe distance. Do not pull directly on the wires or probe around the wires. This same procedure may be used for wires leading to the road. If unable to pull the wire out completely, get an armored vehicle to run down the wire to its end.
Common practice is to “blow in place” any enemy mine that has been detected. This will result in a large crater that must be backfilled and capped. Whenever possible, attempt to extract mines located on an MSR. Use approximately 150' WD-1 wire or parachute cord and an A-frame. Look out for stacked mines and anti-handling devices/booby traps. This removal can be accomplished off to the side of the road with little danger for destruction. After removing a mine from a hole, recheck it for other mines using mine detectors and probes. If multiple mines are to be removed from an area, they should be moved to a single point for demolition; this will save both time and demolition. Removing mines in this manner allows the road to be reopened immediately; eliminates the necessity of repairing a crater; and denies the enemy an excellent location for a mine – a recently repaired road crater. After neutralizing the mine, the hole should be checked again by a mine detector and a prober in case the enemy placed more than one mine in the hole. Also, a vigorous campaign should be conducted to inform users of the road not to leave metallic trash on the MSR.
Always assign a team to the same section of road, as it has been found that efficiency increases as team members become familiar with the condition of the surface and areas of repeated incidents on their part of the road.
Increase the size of the basic sweep team to include four primary detectors which sweep the width of the road. If a positive reading is obtained, the location is marked and the probers start searching the area with the assistance of two backup detectors. By using these additional mine detectors, the primary detectors can remain together and continue sweeping, ensuring complete and continuous coverage of the road.
Sweep with multiple teams, one starting at each end, and pairs of teams diverging from intermediate start points along the MSR and working toward each other. The teams can be inserted by helicopter.
9. Mine Countermeasure SOP Items
The following TTPs maximize force protection and are essential to reducing soldier risk:
10. Patrolling
Patrolling is a requirement throughout the AOR. Units plan, coordinate, rehearse, and certify patrols to ensure the force protection of soldiers. The following TTPs are for all patrols:
Dismounted Patrols
Dismounted patrolling offers the least protection to soldiers, but is necessary in several areas due to restrictive terrain. Commanders can make use of the following techniques to reduce risk and increase force protection for dismounted patrols:
Mounted Patrols
11. Extracting a Vehicle from a Minefield
Extracting a vehicle from a minefield is conducted the same whether a mine strike has occurred or not. All movement should cease upon discovery that the vehicle may be in a minefield. It is important to note that casualties complicate these procedures, but do not supersede them. Use these techniques to prevent more casualties (vehicular and personnel) in the event of a mine strike:
12. Breaching Operations Under Fire
The first technique for encountering a minefield is to try to find a bypass. Breaching minefields under fire is one of the most complex and challenging tasks in combat. The casualties and time delays incurred breaching threat minefields will severely degrade decisive offensive action.
Breaching is a combined arms operation which is an integral component of any attack. Breaching an obstacle under effective fire is not normally possible because 30-60 minutes of manual breaching in these conditions normally results in catastrophic casualties. If hasty breaching is to be successful, the task force must reduce the obstacle in 7-10 minutes.
13. Security During Mine Clearance
| A unit was conducting minefield clearance with one of the factions. The mines were stockpiled, and EOD emplaced explosives to destroy the mines. All personnel moved to a safe location, and EOD ignited the fuse, a common event that occurs everyday in the ZOS until . . . a soldier saw a farmer walking down a trail toward the field. The farmer had been working the same fields for years and knew where the mines were, so he went about his business as usual. The soldiers alerted the farmer and he moved to safety. However, an older man, unseen by the soldiers, was behind the farmer and continued moving along the trail. The demolitions exploded, and the second man was knocked to the ground, unhurt, but obviously startled. The second man was not seriously injured; however, the entire incident might have been avoided. |
The use of tunnels as hiding places, caches for food and weapons, headquarters complexes, and protection against air strikes and artillery fire has been characteristic of the nature of the war in Afghanistan and other desert environments. An extensive tunnel system containing conference, storage, and hiding rooms, as well as interconnected fighting points, has been frequently encountered. These complexes present a formidable and dangerous obstacle to current operations, which must be dealt with in a systematic, careful, and professional manner. Additionally, they are an outstanding source of intelligence, as evidenced by the documents found during the clearing of tunnels during recent operations.
A. Tunnel Characteristics
The first characteristic of a tunnel complex is normally superb camouflage. Entrances and exits are concealed, bunkers are camouflaged, and even within the tunnel complex itself, side tunnels are concealed, hidden trapdoors are prevalent, and dead-end tunnels are used to confuse the attacker. In many instances, the first indication of a tunnel complex will be fire received from a concealed bunker, which might otherwise have gone undetected. Spoil from the tunnel system is normally distributed over a wide area.
Trapdoors may be used, both at entrances and exits and inside the tunnel complex itself, concealing side tunnels and intermediate sections of a main tunnel. In many cases, a trapdoor will lead to a short change of direction or change of level tunnel, followed by a second trapdoor, a second change of direction, and a third trapdoor opening again into the main tunnel. Trapdoors are of several types: They may be concrete covered by dirt, hard packed dirt reinforced by wire, or a “basin” type consisting of a frame filled with dirt. This latter type is particularly difficult to locate in that probing will not reveal the presence of the trapdoor unless the outer frame is struck by the probe. Trapdoors covering entrances/exits are generally a minimum of 100 meters apart. Booby traps may be used extensively, both inside and outside entrance/exit trapdoors. Typical trapdoor configurations found in Vietnam are shown in the sketches below.

The following typical elevation view of a tunnel entrance section illustrates use of trapdoors. Air shafts are spaced at intervals throughout the system.

Recognition of their cellular nature is important for understanding tunnel complexes. Prisoner interrogation has indicated that many tunnel complexes are interconnected, but the connecting tunnels, concealed by trapdoors or blocked by three to four feet of dirt, are known only to selected persons and are used only in emergencies. Indications also point to interconnections of some length, e.g., 5-7 km, through which relatively large bodies of men may be transferred from one area to another, especially from one “fighting” complex to another. The “fighting” complexes terminate in well-constructed bunkers, in many cases covering likely landing zones in a war zone or base area.
B. Tunnel Techniques
C. A representative equipment list for a tunnel team is shown below:
D. Tunnel Exploitation and Destruction
E. Tunnel Flushing and Denial




F. Dangers
Dangers inherent in tunnel operations fall generally into the following categories and should be taken into account by all personnel connected with these operations:
A. Morale Factors
In recent contingency operations, several soldier support issues have repeatedly been shown to be important factors that should be addressed during planning. It has been found that soldier morale is related to several key issues. These eight issues rate consideration when planning for a contingency operation (no particular priority or hierarchy is intended).
These are areas which have an immediate impact on troop morale – and which the command can address in planning. If the contingency becomes an extended operation, additional soldier support programs should be considered, such as R&R trips, Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (with live coverage of major news and sporting events), and in-country entertainment programs or concerts. These require coordination beyond the command's initial operations planning.
B. Tactical Factors
C. Uniform and Equipment Factors
D. LBE/Ruck Tips
E. Night-Vision Goggles (NVG) Tips
F. Weapons Tips
G. SAW Gunner Tips
H. Claymore Tips
I. Grenade Tips
Following are comments on desert operations made by Colonel Tackaberry, Commander, 24th Aviation Brigade, 24th ID(M), during Operation Desert Storm. Tackaberry’s peers and subordinates told him that putting helicopters in the desert could not be done.
“The plan was for the helicopters to remain at Dhahran Airport. But my heart and my gut said this was wrong," Tackaberry said. “We had to be where the Division was. If we were to be a maneuver brigade, we had to be responsive to them, not back there at some big airport. If we were to be a maneuver brigade, then we had to be there with the other maneuver brigades.”Tackaberry studied a map and spotted a site called Thadj, about a 45-minute flight in a UH-60 north-northwest of Dhahran. It was merely an old, dirt airstrip in the desert, surrounded by nothing but, in Tackaberry’s words, “scorpions, viper snakes, cobra snakes, and sand.”
He was told the OH-58D couldn't make it; that the Army had trouble just keeping the Apache flying in the United States; that the UH-1 couldn't operate out there; and that the UH-60 couldn’t survive, that its blades and APUs would be eaten alive. “Now I grant you that we had problems,” Tackaberry admitted. “Within three weeks of getting there, we had our aircraft on the ground for two reasons: parts and menta1 attitude. But the parts began to come in, and we began to lick the mental problem. We didn't fight the desert, we learned to live in the desert. We did a Black Hawk phase check just 10 days after the first week of being out at Thadj. We pulled maintenance at 0400 in the morning, and sent the guys to sleep in the evenings. So we learned to live there and train there.”
“The harshest and most difficult flying I have ever done was in the desert,” Tackaberry added, “and it was done at night under NVGs -- a real credit to our training methods. We learned you can mature quickly in a place like that, then be ready to go to war.”
Flying in Afghanistan presents a list of difficulties: dust, primitive living and working conditions, and high altitudes in the region's extensive mountain ranges. When landing on soil or sand, helicopters are susceptible to brownout – thick clouds churned up by the rotors’ downdraft that can block a pilot’s vision and cause vertigo. Following are typical problems experienced by aviation assets during operations in a desert environment.
A. Blade Erosion. Blade erosion degraded mission performance. Blades made of composite materials to save weight and enhance survivability were literally melting under the hail of sand. Blade maintenance was difficult to perform in the field environment. The following blade protection maintenance problems were encountered.
1. Rotor Blade Erosion. Helicopter rotor blades were being severely affected by erosion from sand and dust. The UH-60, in particular, experienced erosion problems that rendered main rotor blades unserviceable in as little as 25 flight hours if not treated with erosion protection. AVSCOM procured two rotor blade erosion kits for protection against the harsh environmental conditions in Saudi Arabia. The first kit was an interim kit using a polyurethane paint. A second preferred kit used polyurethane tape on the leading edge of blades. The application process was not extremely difficult, but conditions must be suitable and it is time consuming. The application was labor intensive. Taping developed bubbles which broke and filled with sand, creating an out-of-balance condition. The taping did not last long and was easily destroyed by rain.
2. L-100 coating (Tail rotor). The application was labor intensive, required a clean environment, and was difficult to apply. The time required for application depended on temperature and moisture. If hot and dry, the coating would normally spread unevenly due to the drying speed, with approximately half the can being wasted. If cool and moist, more time was available for application. The coating did not last long, came off unevenly, and created an out-of-balance condition. Some tail booms were replaced due to vibration effects. The application/reapplication usually required the balancing/rebalancing of tail rotor blades.
Special operating procedures developed to minimize sand ingestion/blade erosion.
B. Aircraft covers. Extreme heat, dust, and blowing sand caused premature failures on critical aircraft components. Blowing sand renders glass and acrylic surfaces unserviceable. AVSCOM initiated a review of possible aircraft covers for use in high temperatures with windblown sand and dust. Units should take all issued covers and any available material or coverings that provide shade for conducting maintenance or protect components from blowing sand and dust.
C. Operations in heavy dust conditions. Brown-outs were a constant hazard. Recommendations:
D. Engine performance was degraded due to sand ingestion. Special procedures were developed to minimize sand problems.
E. Night-Vision Systems. Although the night-vision devices/systems enhanced the capabilities of aircrews to fly in the night environment, the ANVIS 6 night-vision goggles (NVGs) proved inadequate for the SWA desert night environment.
F. Training. Aircraft were restricted to a minimum of 150 feet during training for safety reasons. When the war began, pilots were expected to fly at altitudes of 50 feet and below. Pilots felt uneasy due to a lack of training at the lower altitudes. Night operations at low altitudes were extremely difficult in a desert environment without training.
G. Altitude problems. Terrain definition was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discern at altitudes above 80 feet AGL due to a lack of terrain definition. At altitudes below 50-80 feet, AGL rises in terrain elevation are difficult to identify causing potential problems with flying into sand dunes. Many pilots used the IR searchlight as an aid to enhance terrain definition. The dilemma was, Do you fly low with an active IR source (hoping the enemy lacks the sophistication to pick up the source), or do you fly high (above the environment, hoping the enemy lacks radar coverage)? Some helicopters will have difficulty reaching altitude in mountainous regions.
H. Navigation
I. Aircraft Survivability Equipment
J. AH-64 Desert Operations Lessons Learned
Hellfire (HF)
Rockets
30mm Gun
Sensors
Night Vision Systems
AH-64 Equipment Design
Communications
K. UH/EH-60
Weapon Systems
Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)
Equipment Design
L. OH-58D
Aircraft Performance (General)
Sensors
M. Aviation Maintenance Operations
“The machine has made warfare ponderous but has also given it greater velocity . . . it is conspicuous that what the machine has failed to do right up to the present moment is decrease by a single pound the weight an individual has to carry in war.”-- S.L.A. Marshall, The Soldiers’ Load and the Mobility of a Nation
The fighting capability of an infantry soldier is directly related to his load. There is a maximum individual load limit that cannot safely be exceeded if an infantry soldier is expected to accomplish his combat mission. The following examples demonstrate how important it is for commanders to understand their responsibilities for lead planning and load discipline.
| The average rifle platoon soldier's load at the JRTC is 91 pounds.
The average cold weather soldier's load is 101.5 pounds. The average warm weather soldier's load is 88.3 pounds. The average difference between cold weather and warm weather at the soldier level is 13.2 pounds. |
Carry what is required for mission accomplishment, but allow a minimum of comfort items. Train your CSS operators to make up the difference. Leaders, beginning at the team level, should conduct good PCIs to enforce that the packing list is adhered to. A sample of a packing list is provided on page 44, including the weight of everything a soldier might wear or carry. In this suggested list, “worn” includes the uniform, boots, etc., not normally weighed. There are four configurations with this type of packing list and load:

Total load of soldier with ruck, assault pack, LBE, K-Pot, weapon, and uniform would be approximately 95 pounds, not counting AT4, 2x 60mm rounds, Gortex, airborne items, or poly-pro underwear. Bear in mind, the idea is to drop rucks and operate during patrolling with assault packs or the fighting load, then come back to rucksacks during hours of darkness and set up ambush sites or resupply for missions.
The contemporary operational environment (COE) timeline looks at shaping the battle area, deployment of forces to the area, decisive operations to achieve victory, and stability or support operations that follow. Those COE phases are not distinct events with clear bookmarks to evidence when one phase ends and another begins. They may be – and often are – both sequential and parallel.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer combatant CINCs capabilities that are not only rapidly deployable, but also uniquely flexible across the full spectrum of operations. SOF will be on the ground before any conventional force deploys. SOF can reinforce, augment, and complement conventional forces. SOF operate independently in missions that demand small, discrete, highly trained forces. Initially, in Afghanistan, SOF was the main attack while conventional forces were the supporting.
The key to effective SOF integration in conventional operations is the deployment and use of a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE). The SOCCE is critical in teaching Army service leaders how to integrate with SOF. Aside from FID missions, SOF mission profiles also include unconventional warfare (UW), guerilla warfare (GW), direction action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), and coalition support (CS).
The fusion of SOF and conventional fits neatly on the COE event timeline when operations shape the battle area, cover deployment, achieve a decisive goal, or maintain stability in the area.
Hue City. Beirut. Mogadishu. Grozny. Since the end of the Second World War, the population of the world and its conflicts have increasingly moved from the rural countryside to modern cities and urban sprawl. The U.S. Army has found itself on this new battlefield, and greater training emphasis is shifting to these likely future conflicts. There is no end in sight to the Army’s increasing commitment to this role.
Buildings in the urban setting provide excellent cover against small arms rounds or concealment that masks sandbagging and other force protection steps taken by the defender. With the exception of downtown cities, buildings are usually separated by open streets and sidewalks that provide little to no cover for the attacker. On the other hand, excellent fields of fire are available for the defender, although engagement distances are almost always 100 meters or less. Because adjacent buildings are much closer than 100 meters to each other, seizing a foothold in one will probably require suppression or obscuration of several. For the defender, winning the MOUT fight requires making the fight as unfair as possible in the first place. A good way to do this is to defend from buildings that provide cover and concealment for friendly weapons, and fields of fire into streets and engagement areas that offer the attacker fewer targets.
For riflemen and team leaders, the fight is to seize a foothold in a given building and clear individual rooms. At the squad level, the fight is for a floor or a single small building. The platoon fight revolves around larger buildings and small city blocks. At all levels of this fight soldiers will be crossing open areas and securing footholds. The platoon level is the lowest level where we begin to see enough combat power to assault buildings, while still being able to suppress as well as provide all-around 360o security. This fight requires coordination – coordination gained through fire control and distribution, sectors of fire, and fire and maneuver tailored to a MOUT environment. The team leader/squad leader fight frequently focuses on close quarter battle (CQB) tactics to clear rooms; to assault streets, the squad requires support from the platoon to be set up for success.
Generally speaking, there are three weapons systems that cause almost all casualties among units in the MOUT attack: mines and booby traps, indirect fire (usually 82mm mortars), and direct fire from small arms. Direct fire is commonly caused by:
The enemy hits two or three out of every four casualties when they are not clearing or moving inside buildings. To reduce casualties and increase the chances for mission success, we must either:
Isolate:
Isolate is the first step in seizing a building. Isolation is defined in FM 90-10-1, An
Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas, as “seizing terrain that dominates the area
so the enemy cannot supply or reinforce the defenders.” There are two ways, basically, to isolate
a building: by completely surrounding the building on all sides, or with fire. Fire is easier,
faster, and far more common. By advancing to the flanks of the building, units can use
interlocking fire to prevent the enemy from reinforcing or retreating. If units do not do this, the
enemy can easily reinforce the building under attack, or withdraw and fight another day if
threatened. Isolation is very important if units are going to use second-story entry techniques
and fight “top down.” The danger of top down fighting is the lack of logistics support and the
possibility of the unit being trapped without supplies. Isolation of the objective allows units to
use the terrain to their advantage. The defender is pushed out of his building, where he has cover
and concealment, into the open where he has neither and can be easily destroyed. This requires
good adjacent unit coordination and cross-talk. In limited visibility operations, it requires the
use of NVGs and weapons’ sights to their full capability. The night, which makes it easy to
approach and gain entry, makes it easier for the enemy to escape as well.
Mortars are another way to isolate a building with fire. Close-in fires can prevent the enemy from moving in and around the objective. Units will still have to secure a position that allows them to observe the rear of the building to provide observed fires. If not, they will need ammunition to fire continuously, and should plan accordingly.
Securing a foothold:
First, identify the foothold by designating the entry point for the building. Next, identify the
route from the last covered and concealed, or assault position, to the building. This is usually the
shortest distance, immediately across the adjacent street, back yard, or alley. A critical step at
this point is for the soldier to ask, From what enemy-held buildings can the enemy observe my
avenue of approach?, then orient observation and fires on those points to break the mutual
support between enemy positions. Being able to predict suspected enemy positions by reading
the terrain is an important skill to develop.
By looking at the avenue of approach to the entry point from the enemy perspective, it can be determined which buildings and suspected positions are the greatest threat. Sectors of fire can then be assigned that direct friendly shooters at the identified enemy-held buildings. The purpose behind assigning these sectors of fire is to allow the assault team to get that foothold of a room in a building. It takes time to identify the enemy buildings, designate sectors of fire, and make sure everyone understands the plan.
Moving across an open area to assault a building is one of the most dangerous events in MOUT. In this case, remember the sequence “slow-fast-slow:”
Breaching:
There are two types of obstacles a soldier might face: existing and reinforcing. At the platoon level, the most common types of obstacles are (1) mined wire obstacles emplaced by the enemy outside the building, and (2) the doorway, window or wall a soldier must pass through to seize the foothold itself. The best way for a soldier to enter, ROE permitting, is to make a hole through the wall. Next best way to enter a building is through a window, with doors being the least preferred way. If the friendly- and enemy-held buildings are adjoining, “mouseholing” with demolitions is preferable; otherwise, AT4s, LAWs, or other munitions should be used from the safety of a building, rather than out in the open emplacing explosives by hand. Caution should be taken, however, when firing AT4s and LAWs from inside a building since they can bring the ceiling down on the firer’s head or set the room on fire, particularly in Afghanistan. An effective technique, and one used by Chechens in Grozny in 1994, is to task organize “teams” under an NCO. Using pair or volley technique, a breach can be rapidly made, and provides the enemy the least time in advance as a warning. Hollow charge weapons generally are not designed to breach walls, and one may not be enough. High-explosive warheads (such as those in the AT8, SMAW, and Carl Gustav) have a better ability to breach masonry. Main gun rounds from tanks are very effective.
The breaching fundamentals SOSR (suppress, obscure, secure, reduce) will be helpful. Smoke grenades draw fire; at a minimum, the enemy can be expected to shoot blindly into the smoke cloud. Speed of movement and breaching minimize exposure times. Assault teams must move fast and stay dispersed. If possible, do not stack outside the entry point. Get inside as quickly as possible.
Clearing methodically:
Once a foothold in the building is seized, the tactical problem for the defender changes. If the enemy is smart and is willing to trade space for time, he may elect to withdraw and take up the fight again on the other side of the next street or suitable clear field of fire, or reoccupy the building after the attacking force moves on. If the enemy regards the building as key terrain and is willing to fight for it, the fight does not end until the enemy is destroyed in the building. The defenders inside will shift their attention away from the support by fire (SBF) across the street and toward the assault force as it clears from room to room. On the other hand, defenders of adjacent buildings now know where the entry point is, if they can see it. Follow-on assault teams “run the gauntlet” to reinforce the foothold. There must be a plan for how follow-on teams will enter the building, and a senior leader within the platoon should play “traffic cop” to maintain intervals and dispersion. Fires from SBF positions should shift off the building, but still must focus on identifying and suppressing the enemy and protecting friendly reinforcements. Elements isolating the objective have a difficult task as well, and must be prepared for brief sightings of fleeting targets as the enemy makes his escape. Some shooters should stay oriented on the building until it is completely secured. While many platoons have SOPs that require them to mark every window and door, in reality this never happens. Room-clearing teams, in the heat of battle, have other things to do. Marking cleared floors and cleared buildings is a must, but there should not be an unrealistic expectation of what clearing teams will accomplish.
Moving in MOUT
Many units are adept at clearing rooms using the “stack” technique. Correctly employed, stacks allow units to dominate the room with overwhelming firepower in minimum time. One by-product of this is that leaders like to “stack” outside on the friendly side of buildings so they can control their soldiers better. There is a fine line between stacking and bunching up. It is not uncommon to see 5-10 soldiers stacked behind every friendly-held building where perfectly good cover and concealment is available on the other side of the very wall they are leaning against. This makes soldiers extremely vulnerable to snipers and airbursts from 82mm mortar fires. Platoon and company command posts, reserve squads, and casualty collection points are some of the biggest offenders. Good forward observers are aware of this trend and will act accordingly. In the terrain of urban combat, buildings offer cover and concealment from enemy fire and observation. They are the best avenue of approach through a city. Stacking outside buildings and moving around exterior walls are techniques that offer speed, but by considering buildings obstacles to movement, soldiers are put at risk. A reminder to units: If you’re not doing anything, don’t do it outdoors!
One technique that can have a great impact on the ability to defeat the enemy in MOUT is second-story entry techniques or fighting “top down.” Clearing “top down” is an effective way to secure a building. Its chief advantage is that it keeps the attacker from being bottlenecked fighting up a stairwell and forces the enemy down to the ground floor and out into the open, rather than trapped in an upper floor where there is no alternative but to make a last stand. The chief drawback to second-story techniques is they are time consuming, and increase the time spent and vulnerability of solders in the open if buildings do not adjoin and soldiers are forced to use ladders or grapnels. Speed in getting inside a building may take precedence over entry onto an upper-level floor. If the enemy has the ability to observe the entry point, obviously assault teams will become extremely vulnerable. To clear “top down” requires detailed coordination. A unit must be able to secure the entry point from enemy fire. As related before, units attempting to fight top down and drive the enemy out into the street should take the time to cover enemy withdrawal routes with fire to prevent the enemy from escaping to set up a new defense.
Another caution in the top down technique is the possibility that the isolated force in the top down scenario may be in a trap where the entire building is destroyed to create the maximum number of casualties. IPB preparation is very important in MOUT.
Mortars in MOUT
Every potential foe on the planet watched CNN during Desert Storm, and saw what we did to the Iraqi forces. They also watched what happened in Somalia, and saw our nation's Achilles heel. Believe me, the lesson was not lost on them. They will fight us where they believe we are weakest....and they will fight us asymmetrically.General Charles C. Krulak
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Mortars are valuable in providing indirect fire support during military operations on urbanized terrain. Indirect fire by FA has often been unavailable to infantrymen and in city combat due to building mask and lack of effective observation. Mortars have some distinct advantages during MOUT. The use of multi-option fuzes and several types of rounds increases mortar fire versatility.
Positon Selection
Key considerations for the selection of positions include:
Mask and overhead clearance may initially be difficult to achieve due to a combination of building heights and minimum-range requirements. Position selection should be open enough to allow full coverage of the sector of fire without mask or overhead interference at minimum ranges. Often, parking lots or parks must be used to achieve required clearances.
The selection of mortar positions depends on the size of buildings, the size of the urban area, and the mission:
Communications
Magnetic Interference
In an urban environment, all magnetic instruments are affected by surrounding structural steel, electrical cables, and automobiles. Minimum distance guidelines for the use of the M2 aiming circle will be difficult to apply. To overcome this problem, obtain an azimuth to a distant aiming point. From this azimuth, subtract the back azimuth of the direction of fire. Index the difference on the red scale, and manipulate the gun until the vertical crosshair of the sight is on the aiming point. Such features as the direction of a street may be used instead of a distant aiming point.
Aiming Posts
Posts may be placed vertically in dirt-filled cans or ammunition boxes if the frontal area is covered by concrete or asphalt. Natural aiming points, such as the edges of buildings or lampposts, may also be used.
High-Explosive Ammunition
During MOUT, mortar HE fires are more heavily used than any other type of indirect fire weapon. The most common and valuable use for mortars is often harassment and interdiction fires. One of their greatest contributions is interdicting supplies, evacuation efforts, and reinforcement in the enemy rear just behind his forward defensive positions. Although mortar fires are often targeted against roads and other open areas, the natural dispersion of indirect fires will result in many hits on buildings. Leaders must use care when planning mortar fires during MOUT to minimize collateral damage.
Other Considerations
When planning the use of mortars, commanders must consider the following:
BOS Trends in MOUT
The following BOS reflect negative trends associated with CTC rotations in MOUT. Units should review these trends and use them to focus training. Focused training can assist in ensuring that soldiers are combat ready to overcome difficulties while fighting in a MOUT environment.
INTELLIGENCE BOS
MANEUVER BOS
FIRE SUPPORT BOS
MOBILITY AND SURVIVABILITY BOS
COMMAND AND CONTROL BOS
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT BOS
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY BOS
Soldiers deploying to Afghanistan will adapt to the conditions they may face and will perform their mission well once they understand the simple rules of soldiering at high altitudes.
What soldiers can expect while conducting high-altitude operations
Many soldiers are recreational skiers, skiing under the pristine conditions of some high glacier or mountain in Europe or in the western United States, and often experiencing the symptoms of high-altitude sickness. The headaches, the lethargic feeling, the lack of an appetite, the feeling of exhaustion, and the dehydration associated with the energy expenditure on the slopes have made many skiers call it an early day. The same skiers return the following day unaware of their increased resistance to the high altitude. This newly discovered energy is simply becoming adjusted to their new environment. In many cases, the skiers increase their energy level expenditure for each subsequent day, with growing familiarity, conditioning, and confidence in their new surroundings. The skiers are simply compensating for each day's problems by drinking a lot of fluids, eating well at night (eating in many cases way above their normal intake), and dropping into a sound and restful sleep. They emerge from their hotel the next day rested and ready to deal with the slopes and their new surroundings, having adjusted their body and mind to the conditions.
The high-altitude battlefield
The al-Qaida and Taliban forces that U.S. and coalition forces are fighting in Afghanistan have numerous factors favoring their use of high-altitude operations. The high-altitude Afghanistan region bordering Pakistan resembles the area on the Pakistan and India border where numerous clashes have occurred between Pakistan and India. This includes battles on the Siachin Glacier, which has the distinction of being the world's highest battlefield at 19,000 feet. The Indian and Pakistani armies facing each other on this battlefield have been credited as being the foremost experts of high-altitude warfare for good reason. In operations against each other, their casualties have been high, yet the most significant factor is that 80 percent have been directly related to either cold or high altitude.
High-altitude conditions
Soldiers operating at high altitudes can expect some significant health problems that they otherwise may never encounter. With the current combat operations in Afghanistan, many soldiers, Marines, and coalition forces are soldiering in conditions that in the past were the operational environment and realm of well-trained Special Operations Forces (SOF). High-altitude operations increase energy requirements by as much as 50 percent and, coupled with cold temperatures and increased physical activity, have the potential of making soldier missions a secondary thought to surviving. The increase in physical activity may only be offset by thorough acclimatization and conditioning and equipment designed for the conditions, as well as special skills and training. These factors may have a direct impact on how a soldier performs in high-altitude conditions.
Acute mountain sickness (AMS) is a sickness that may begin at 8,000 feet above sea level. The symptoms listed below may be linked to a high rate of ascent. Many factors influence who becomes ill and who does not. A modest descent may easily reverse the following symptoms:
One illness and a step up from AMS that has the potential for disrupting military operations, and one with life-threatening implications, is hypoxia. Hypoxia is high-altitude sickness in its worst form. It is a condition in which the tissues of the body are starved for oxygen. The body reacts to this loss of oxygen by increased breathing to get more air. The physical activity of the body increases the heart rate. This condition can cloud judgment. Symptoms of hypoxia include dizziness, giddiness, a tingling sensation, euphoria, blurred and/or tunnel vision, lack of muscle coordination, and a demonstrative slow reaction time. The condition affects every soldier differently depending on the soldier’s age, general health, physical conditioning, and training.
The results of hypoxia can have minimal effect on an individual at 10,000 feet, but will surely increase in effects as that individual increases altitude, with a loss of consciousness and possible death above 35,000 feet. Operations above this level absolutely require an oxygen supply. The distance in altitude between 10,000 feet and 35,000 feet in operational terms is directly related to the effects of hypoxia on the soldier's ability to accomplish the mission without taking into account the other factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time available (METT-T).
What soldiers in high-altitude conditions should and should not do
What should a soldier eat while operating at high altitudes? Remember, weight loss is a characteristic of operations at high altitude; soldiers must guard against weight loss. The average weight loss for a special forces team working with the high-altitude mountain school in 1994 was 20 to 25 pounds while living on Pakistani rations. Their schedule included 6 days of activity, 12 hours a day, but just moving around created exertion beyond the normal. The bottom line in working at this altitude is that you are going to lose weight, but you must control weight loss before it becomes incapacitating. This weigh loss leads to fatigue, loss of strength, and psychological changes, such as decreased mental capacity and alertness, along with low morale. All of these conditions can contribute to accidents and a failure to accomplish the mission.
What soldiers should eat and drink while operating at high-altitudes
What soldiers should NOT eat or drink while operating at high-altitudes
Altitude sickness in most forms is preventable. Leaders must take precautions to protect their soldiers at moderate altitudes to avoid illness. Successful strategies to prevent altitude sickness are simple and inexpensive: spend a night at an intermediate altitude before moving higher, take it easy one day at each succeeding altitude level, drink plenty of fluids, eat a full diet, and avoid all alcohol.
Tactical considerations during high-altitude operations
Initial observations received from Afghanistan provide some interesting interpretations as to how soldiers are performing in the theater. In most cases, these observations include soldiers that have been in training already for mountainous operations, either as conventional infantry or SOF. The real test of long-term operations may depend on follow-on light infantry forces that have to this point rarely trained for this type of operation. There is still time to prepare soldiers for the rigor of high-altitude operations, but the training and equipping of these soldiers must begin now. Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldiers (DTLOMS) provide the basis for examining these initial observations and how the Army can begin reacting to the needs of soldiers in theater. A caution must be added to any interpretation of these observations, as these operations are unique. They were made in a specified region of the world where many of these conditions may never be duplicated. Yet, the real advantage of reviewing the observations is that they are relatively concise; many offer simple and easy solutions to a problem. A few others will take some considerable effort, time, and resources to resolve.
High-altitude tactical observations
To win in cold weather, soldiers must also overcome an additional enemy: the extreme and unforgiving cold weather environment. This means preventing and defeating cold injuries, such as hypothermia and frostbite. Cold injuries, if allowed to develop, become debilitating to the soldier (or possibly fatal, in the case of hypothermia) and threaten the unit’s ability to defeat an enemy force in cold weather operations.
The four essential requirements for survival in cold environments are:
Keeping the soldier warm and nourished are essential factors in preventing cold injuries and sustaining the combat power of the fighting force. Shelter is particularly important because without it, it is difficult to provide warmth and nutrition to soldiers in a cold environment.
Heat Production
The body's three main physiological means for producing heat are metabolism, exercise, and shivering.
Heat Loss
There are five mechanisms by which our bodies lose heat. The primary means of heat loss is through the skin.
When exposed to the environment, the skin serves as a radiator. Unlike the rest of the body, the blood vessels in the head do not constrict and reduce the blood supply flowing to the scalp. The head is, therefore, an excellent radiator of heat, eliminating from 35 to 50 percent of our total heat production. In cold weather operations, dry insulation, especially on the head, is essential in minimizing heat loss.
The right approach to winning in the winter keeps soldiers healthy and focused on the mission. There are four basic rules to remember:
Common Hypothermic Casualties
The preferred field management practice is to immediately evacuate the hypothermic casualty. If immediate evacuation is not possible, a unit combat lifesaver should proceed with the following measures to slow further deterioration of the hypothermic soldier's condition.
Moderate Hypothermia
Symptoms: If a chilled or cold soldier does not respond immediately to basic rewarming
efforts, or if he continues to exhibit symptoms of hypothermia, the soldier may be in a more
advanced stage of hypothermia than initially thought, and the leader should immediately initiate
action to evacuate the soldier to a medical facility.
Treatment: Move the casualty out of the wind to a sheltered environment. Replace wet
clothing with dry clothing or sleeping bags. Cover the casualty with blankets or other insulating
material. Apply heating pads (if available) wrapped in towels to the casualty's armpits, groin,
and abdomen. Give the casualty warm, nutritious fluids to drink. Do not give alcoholic
beverages or tobacco products to the casualty. Wrap the casualty from head to toe and evacuate
to a medical treatment facility in a recumbent (lying down) position.
Severe Hypothermia
Symptoms: In severe cases of hypothermia, the patient produces little or no heat and, in the
absence of external heat sources, may cool further. Immediate evacuation is the preferred action
for casualties suffering severe hypothermia; treatment should not be undertaken in the field. Do
not delay evacuation to attempt rewarming. Rapid rewarming may lead to “rewarming shock.”
Treatment: Cut away wet clothing and replace with dry clothing. Ensure that the
casualty's airway remains open, but do not use an oropharyngeal airway (J-tube). Perform
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation if the casualty's breathing rate drops below five respirations per
minute. Apply an additional heat source. The casualty's body is not able to generate sufficient
body heat and must receive warmth from another source. One method is to place the casualty in
a sleeping bag with his outer clothing removed and have another soldier also remove his outer
clothing and get into the sleeping bag with him. Cover both soldiers with additional clothing.
The casualty's body will absorb the heat given off by the second soldier's body. Evacuate the
casualty to a medical treatment facility as soon as possible. Evacuate the casualty even if you
cannot detect respiration or a heartbeat. Handle the casualty gently.
Frostbite
Frostbite is the freezing or crystallization of living tissues. Exposure time can be minutes or
instantaneous if skin is directly exposed to extreme cold or high winds. Heat loss occurs faster
than it can be replaced by blood circulation, and is compounded by intense cold and inactivity.
The extremities (fingers, toes, and ears) and face are affected first. Damp hands and feet may
freeze quickly since moisture conducts heat away from the body and destroys the insulating
value of clothing. The extent of frostbite depends on temperature and duration of exposure.
Frostbite is one of the major nonfatal cold-weather injuries encountered in military operations.
With proper clothing and equipment properly maintained and used, frostbite can be prevented.
The categories of frostbite are:
Chilblain
Symptoms: Chilblain is caused by prolonged exposure of bare skin to cool or cold
temperatures (50oF [10oC] or lower). Signs and symptoms of chilblain include acutely red,
swollen, hot, tender, and/or itching skin. Open sores or bleeding lesions may result from
continued exposure.
Treatment: Apply local warming (putting bare hands over the affected area on the face;
putting affected hands inside the uniform under the armpits; putting bare feet against the
abdomen of another soldier). Do not rub or massage the affected area. Rubbing or massaging
the area may cause tissue damage. Signs and symptoms of tissue damage may be slow to
appear. Apply a field dressing to lesions. Have medical personnel evaluate the casualty when
practical.
Immersion Syndrome
Immersion syndrome results from prolonged exposure (hours to days) to wet conditions at
temperatures from 50oF to 32oF. Immersion syndrome occurs when cold, wet conditions
constrict blood vessels. Immersion foot, trench foot, and trench hand are types of immersion
syndrome injuries. Reduced blood flow to the extremity deprives cells of needed oxygen and
nutrients. Permanent muscle and nerve damage may result if this cold injury is allowed to
develop. For the soldier, regular attention to his feet – drying them and changing to clean dry
socks once a day, or more often if his feet get wet – is all that is needed to prevent immersion
foot or trench foot.
Symptoms: The extremity appears cold, swollen, and mottled. Cyanosis, a blueness of the
skin resulting from imperfectly oxygenated blood, is usually present. Tactile sensitivity is
reduced, as is capillary refill time. The extrimity may look shiny. The patient may describe the
affected area as feeling wooden.
Immersion syndrome usually occurs in three stages. In the first phase, the affected part is
cold and without pain. There is a weak pulse at the site. In the second phase, the affected limb
feels hot, as though burning, and has shooting pains. In the third phase, the casualty has pale
skin, cyanosis around the nailbeds and lips, and decreased pulse strength.
When the extremity rewarms, the skin becomes warm, dry, and red. The pulse bounds and
the injury is painful. The injured area may itch, tingle, and exhibit increased sensitivity to cold,
possibly permanently. Recovery can last weeks. Nerve damage may be permanent. The
development of blisters, ulcers, and gangrene is possible. Amputation may also be necessary.
Treatment: Dry the affected part immediately. Rewarm the affected area gradually in
warm air. Do not massage the extremity. The affected area will probably become swollen, red,
and hot to the touch after it has been rewarmed. Blisters may form. Remove wet clothing and
replace with dry, warm clothing. Protect the casualty from injury and infection. Elevate the
affected part to reduce edema (swelling). Evacuate to a medical treatment facility as soon as
practical.
Snowblindness
Symptoms: Snowblindness is a temporary but often painful condition caused by inadequate
eye protection when operating in brilliant sunshine reflecting off snow or light-colored rock.
The eyes become bloodshot and feel irritated and “full of sand.”
Treatment: The proper field management technique is to apply clean, cool, wet
compresses to the eyes. The patient should then wear dark, UV-protective glasses. Aspirin can
be used to control the pain. Occasionally, it may be necessary to cover the patient's eyes and
lead him by the hand to an area where treatment can be administered. Recovery may take two or
three days.
Sunburn
Sunburn, often associated with a summer day at the beach, can also become a debilitating
cold weather injury. Both first- and second-degree burns are possible in cold weather
operations.
Symptoms: First-degree burns involve reddening of the skin; second-degree burns are
characterized by the formation of blisters. Mountain climbers are especially vulnerable to
sunburn because they often operate at high-altitude environments covered with highly reflective
snow fields. The relatively thinner air allows more of the burning rays of the sun to penetrate the
atmosphere and reflect off the snow. Because the air temperature seems relatively cold, soldiers
may miscalculate the intensity of the sun or simply be too weary to take preventive action.
Treatment: Sunburn usually is treated on first notice by further applications of sunburn
preventive. Sun screens/blocks should be used rather than the more common cosmetic suntan
preparations. In mild cases, sunburned soldiers can continue their duties even though they may
suffer significant discomfort for a few days. In more severe cases, such as second-degree
sunburn (with blister formation), soldiers should be treated by medical personnel who can assess
the impact of their injuries on their assigned duties. If there is much swelling, cold compresses
should be applied. Aspirin may be taken for pain, and warm liquids should be administered to
replenish body fluids. (Salty liquids can be administered if prescribed by medical personnel. If
sunburned soldiers drink salt solutions without medical monitoring, they may become nauseated
and vomit, thus compounding their dehydrated state.)
Dehydration
Symptoms: In addition to irritability, other signs of dehydration include darkening urine,
decreased amounts of urine being produced, dry mouth, tiredness, mental sluggishness, lack of
appetite, increased or rapid heartbeat, dizziness, and even unconsciousness.
Treatment: The most important consideration is prevention. Leaders should ensure that
soldiers consume four to six quarts of fluid per day. Coffee and liquids containing caffeine (tea,
cocoa, soft drinks) should not be considered adequate sources for replenishing body fluids
because they act as a diuretic, removing fluids from the body. Drinks containing caffeine should
only be consumed in moderation – not as the primary means of hydration. If the soldier is
conscious, administer fluids by mouth. If improvement is not obvious in an hour, evacuate the
patient to a medical facility. In advanced stages of dehydration, as in the case of an unconscious
soldier, immediately evacuate the patient to a medical treatment facility.
Constipation
Symptoms: Constipation is the difficulty in passing feces caused by a deficiency in body
fluids (dehydration), improper nutrition, infrequent or irregular defecation, or ignoring nature's
call altogether for extended periods. Contributing factors include the unavailability of water,
lack of sites protected from the elements to facilitate normal body functions, and not eating the
food provided. Symptoms of constipation include loss of appetite, headache, cramping, and
painful defecation.
Treatment: Treatment involves the consumption of adequate amounts and variety of foods
and water (four to six quarts per day), and responding to nature’s call to rid the body of waste.
High-fiber foods, especially fruits, vegetables, and whole grain breads, are effective in
combating constipation if accompanied by regular and adequate amounts of water. If
constipation is allowed to progress beyond the self-care stage, medical treatment is necessary.
Carbon Monoxide Poisoning
Carbon monoxide poisoning occurs when oxygen in the body is replaced by carbon
monoxide. For soldiers, the main contributing factor is inhalation of fumes produced by fires in
areas that lack proper ventilation. Stoves and heaters in tents and running vehicle engines in
which fumes leak into the cab or cargo areas are primary sources of carbon monoxide poisoning.
Symptoms: Signs and symptoms of carbon monoxide poisoning progress slowly. At the
onset, they may go unnoticed because carbon monoxide is colorless, tasteless, and odorless.
Many of the signs and symptoms are similar to other common illnesses: headache, tiredness,
excessive yawning, confusion, followed by unconsciousness and, eventually, death. A cherry-red coloring to the tissues of the lips, mouth, and inside the eyelids occurs very late in carbon
monoxide poisoning – when the patient is very near death. If this condition occurs, it may be too
late to save the soldier. Action must be taken when earlier signs and symptoms appear.
Treatment: Immediately remove the victim from the source of contamination. If the
soldier is not breathing on his own, administer rescue breathing. If available, give the soldier
oxygen, then immediately evacuate the soldier to a medical facility. Severe complications can
develop, even in casualties who appear to have recovered perfectly.
Prevention is the key. Carbon monoxide poisoning can be prevented if unit leaders enforce
a few simple rules:
Tent Eye
Tent eye is caused by fumes emanating from stoves and lanterns operated in a poorly
ventilated shelter. It can be prevented by using properly functioning stoves and lanterns, and
adequately ventilating the shelter. First aid for tent eye is fresh air.
Leadership in Cold Weather Operations
The process of developing soldiers into cold weather fighters requires positive leadership. Leaders must understand the environmental threat and include plans for countering this threat in their operational plans or tactical standing operating procedures. Initially, the cold environment may be alarming, even frightening, to soldiers unaccustomed to operating in wintry conditions, especially when deployed to unfamiliar, remote areas. Some soldiers will find themselves confronted with challenges they have not encountered before. The cold becomes a constant reminder to the soldier of his vulnerability in the extreme environment and the likelihood of him becoming a casualty should he make a mistake. As soldiers gain experience, they develop confidence in themselves, their clothing, and their equipment, and learn they can fight and win in the winter, defeating both the cold and the enemy before them.
Aggressive, cheerful leadership is essential in helping soldiers overcome the challenges of the cold environment. To defeat the enemy, soldiers must first overcome the cold by learning how to live and survive the elements so they can focus on the enemy. Leaders must maintain a positive attitude toward the mission, their soldiers, and the equipment they have to carry out the tasks at hand.
Intense cold affects the mind as well as the body. Essential tasks take longer to perform and require more effort than in temperate climates. This should be considered when planning operations and giving orders – even for such routine tasks as vehicle maintenance and making or striking camp. There is no simple formula for the extra time required to accomplish tasks; it varies with differing conditions, state of training, and degree of acclimatization of the troops. It should not, however, be used as an excuse for overinsurance; troops readied unnecessarily early or left standing in the open after striking camp will suffer physically. Their morale will ebb – possibly at times when it should be at a high pitch.
Tips for Leaders in Cold Weather Operations
Leaders need to be aware of the symptoms that characterize a unit having difficulty coping with the cold environment. The following tips will help combat the effects of the cold when it begins to affect the minds of soldiers.
The Cold Weather Clothing System
Leaders should understand the design principles of the military cold weather clothing system. These principles are:
Insulate: Insulation allows the creation of a microclimate around the body through which the amount of body heat lost to the environment can be regulated. By varying the amount of insulation, a soldier can regulate the amount of heat lost or retained.
Layer: Several layers of clothing provide more insulation and flexibility than one heavy garment, even if the heavy garment is as thick as the combined layers. By adding or removing layers of clothing (insulation), the soldier can regulate the amount of heat lost or retained.
Ventilate: Ventilation helps maintain a comfortable microclimate around the body, thereby helping control body temperature. By ventilating, the soldier can release excess heat and minimize sweating, which can lower body temperature later as it evaporates.
There are four ways to apply the principles in the military cold weather clothing system:
Keep clothing clean. Dirt and grease clog the air spaces in clothing and reduce the insulating effect. Dirty clothes are cold clothes.
Avoid overheating. Select the clothing needed to stay comfortable, or even a little cool. Leaders should ensure that their soldiers are not overdressed for the job they are performing.
Wear it loose. All items of the cold weather uniform are sized to allow wearing of the appropriate number of layers. This means, for example, that the field jacket may appear too large when worn without all of the layers designed to fit under it. If the uniform items do not fit loosely, the insulation will be substantially reduced.
Keep it dry. It is vital that all layers of clothing be kept dry because wet clothing conducts heat away from the body, compromising the microclimate around the body and making it difficult to regulate body temperature. Moisture soaks into clothing from two directions: from melting snow and frost that has collected on the outside of the clothing and from perspiration. Leaders should ensure that soldiers brush snow and frost from clothing before entering heated shelters or vehicles.
Throughout history, disease and non-battle injuries have been the largest cause of military casualties. Personal hygiene is difficult, at best, in cold weather operations. The role of field sanitation is to aid the unit in protecting the health of troops. Field sanitation concerns itself with the basic responsibilities of:
Methods for field sanitation include the following:
The following techniques and procedures can be used to maintain minimal personal hygiene in the field, especially if laundry and bath support is not readily available:
Foot Care
Establishing Garbage Pits
Waste management
All types of waste are generated each day in the field. Always bury your waste immediately to prevent flies from spreading germs from waste to your food. Also, burying your waste helps keep unwanted animals out of your bivouac area. If waste is not disposed of properly, the camp will quickly become an ideal breeding area for flies, rats, and other vermin. Diseases such as dysentery, typhoid, cholera, dengue, and plague could compromise the integrity of the unit. To combat this problem, unit medical personnel should provide technical assistance in the fabrication, location, and maintenance of field waste-disposal facilities. They also inspect these facilities before their initial use to ensure their proper construction and location, and then reinspect on a daily basis.
Establishing Latrines
Prevent Skin Infections
Bathe frequently; take a full bath at least once every week. If showers or baths are not available, use a washcloth daily to wash:
Potable Water
Safe potable water is essential to the Army. Water that is not properly treated can transmit such diseases as typhoid and paratyphoid fevers, bacillary dysentery, cholera, poliomyelitis, and common diarrhea. In some areas, water may also be the means of transmitting infectious hepatitis, schistosomiasis, and amoebic dysentery. Lessons from Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM showed that units should use a planning factor of at least 7 gallons of water per soldier per 24-hour period.
Treat the individual water supply with one iodine tablet per a quart-size canteen if the water is clear, two tablets if the water is cloudy. Let stand for 5 minutes with the cap loosened, and shake to permit leakage to rinse the thread around the neck. Tighten cap and let stand for 20 minutes. Calcium hypochlorite maybe used: Add one ampule in one-half canteen cup of water, dissolve, then pour one canteen cap of the solution in the canteen, shake and let stand for 30 minutes.
The best containers for small quantities of water (5 gallons) is plastic water cans. Water in plastic cans will be good up to 72 hours, compared to metal which will only be good for 24 hours. However, you should change the water in your canteen at least every 24 hours. Water in trailers, if kept in the shade, will last up to 5 days. If the temperature outside exceeds 100oF, the temperature of your water must be monitored, and when it exceeds 92oF, it should be changed, as bacteria will multiply. If not changed, you will end up with a case of diarrhea. Ice in containers will keep water cool. If ice is put in the water trailers, the ice in it must be removed before the trailer is moved, as the floating ice may destroy the inner protection of the trailer.
A UAV is operated without an internal pilot; instead, it is controlled from remote locations via radio frequency (RF). It provides near-real time video of the battlefield transmitted to a controlling shelter and remote video terminals (RVT). The UAV provides the commander a platform to collect near-real time video, resulting in better informed and timely decisions.
A buildup of domestic UAV configurations, promoted by the Department of Defense (DOD), occurred in the late 1980s and well into the 1990s. This occurred as DOD sought UAVs to satisfy their mission-unique surveillance requirements in either a close range, short range, or endurance category of vehicle. Close range was defined to be within 50 kilometers, short range was defined as within 200 kilometers, and endurance as anything beyond. With the advent of newer technology and with the demonstrated performance of the UAVs, the current classes or combination of these type vehicles are called the tactical UAV, followed by the endurance category.
The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) contributes significantly to battlefield awareness. UAV-provided information has improved the quality and timeliness of battlefield intelligence, keeping decision-makers better informed. While the primary mission of the UAV remains reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA), the UAV can be employed in support of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), situation development, battle management, battle damage assessment (BDA), rear area security, and command and control (C2). UAVs can perform many missions, which would normally be considered unacceptable or unsafe for manned aircraft. That is not to say that the UAV is an asset to be expended needlessly. METT-T will dictate when such attrition should be considered. Even then, every effort should be made to preserve the UAV because of its value as “eyes” over the battlefield.
Several autonomous UAVs have been fielded which can be given GPS-based or INS-based navigational parameters and then are left to loiter and collect SIGINT, COMINT, photography, or real-time television images, and flash the data or images back to troop commanders. Supposition is that newer, stealthy versions may even be able to be used as strategic assets, dropped by aircraft near target country borders, sneak in at low or very high altitudes, take their pictures or gather intelligence, and then sneak back out to be recovered, all without an opponent knowing anything has happened.
The UAV can support the commander in day or night operations. According to the tactical UAV concept of operations, it will fly 12 hours per day, with a surge capability of up to a maximum of 72 hours continuous if authorized by the commander. Manning will affect this as well. Surge operations come at a cost: the UAV is down for maintenance for 72 hours for maintenance following the surge.
The UAV is capable of conducting day and night operations including:
As technology advances, the UAV will perform missions, such as mine detection, NBC detection, laser designation/targeting and weather surveillance. Other UAV systems, such as Predator, have been using Hellfire missiles in strike missions in Afghanistan. Those type capabilities will continue to grow.
Weather Limitations
The weather must be considered in developing the collection plan. If any of the following conditions are present, the mission will not launch:
Command and Control
C² of the UAV company is strictly based upon its location in the area of operations. In the general support role, the G2 determines how the UAV will be used based on the commander's PIR. When the shelter is located at the brigade TOC, the controlling element is the brigade.
Lags in UAV targeting is a common occurrence. Whether the delay is a lack of communication, lack of situational awareness, or a lag in the dissemination of the intelligence, the fact remains that good intelligence is not being used to its fullest potential. The brigade requires imagery analysts to allow instant analysis of UAV imagery, or if better imagery training were provided to the other imagery MOS and identification added to their job descriptions, then the possibility of someone being available to exploit imagery at the brigade level would be greatly increased. Better communications between brigade, fire support, the UAV, and whomever is exploiting the imagery will further decrease the lag time.
UAV Employment Concept
The UAV system should be used during the first critical days of a conflict. That is when air defenses are most numerous and aircrews most vulnerable to these defenses because of inexperience in combat. High losses of UAVs are much more acceptable than those of aircrews and their airplanes.
When used, UAVs should generally perform missions characterized by the three “Ds”: dull, dirty, and dangerous. Dull means long-endurance missions which, in the future, could continue for several days. Dirty means jobs, such as detecting chemical agents and their intensity; certainly a mission to avoid if possible. Dangerous missions for unmanned vehicles are numerous and growing. Two that come to mind, however, are reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines and suppression of enemy air defenses.
Food and Waterborne Diseases
Sanitation is extremely poor throughout the country, including major urban areas. Local food and water sources, including ice, are heavily contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, parasites, and viruses to which most U.S. service members have little or no natural immunity. If local food, water, or ice from unapproved sources is consumed, diarrheal diseases can be expected to temporarily incapacitate a very high percentage of personnel within days. Hepatitis A, typhoid fever, and hepatitis E are common among the local population; these diseases can cause prolonged illness in a smaller percentage of U.S. personnel exposed to contaminated food or water sources. In addition, large cholera outbreaks occur among the local population annually and could pose a risk to U.S. personnel.
A. Food
High-risk food items, such as fresh eggs, unpasteurized dairy products, lettuce or other uncooked vegetables, and raw or undercooked meats, should be avoided unless they are from U.S. military approved sources. Those who must consume unapproved foods should choose low-risk foods, such as bread and other baked goods, fruits that have thick peels (washed with safe water), and boiled foods such as rice and vegetables.
The availability of food varies widely within regions and between regions. Food sources (both plants and wildlife) are most abundant where two biological regions meet, such as a beach, river, or stream bank; the edge of a marsh; or a cleared area in a forest.
1. Availability
In forests, there is likely to be little vegetation on the forest floor; consequently, few animals and little food can be found there. The best potential areas to locate food are stream banks and clearings.
In marshes and swamps, extensive natural foods are available. Plant life includes water lilies and cattails, while edible animal life includes turtles, snakes, and fish. Unfortunately, some snakes are poisonous, so approach them with care and kill them from a distance by pinning their head down with a forked stick and crushing their head with a rock or cutting it off. Be aware that snakes can strike from a distance equal to a considerable portion of their body length (the distance varies with the snake), and can strike more quickly if coiled. After procurement, discard the head with care (bury it). Prepare and eat snakes like other small game.
In agricultural areas, the availability of food varies according to the type of farming. In areas of commercial-type agriculture (such as plantations) there may be little food available, especially during non-growing seasons, because plantations will concentrate on one crop. Considerable food may be found in subsistence farming areas, including grain, vegetables, and domestic animals. However, farms may have dogs or fowl, which can be expected to react with alarm to the approach of a stranger.
In desert areas, little food is likely to be available. One of the few available animals may be snakes.
2. Food Considerations
Food can dehydrate and kill if there isn't sufficient water in the body for sweat and digestion. The body will give priority to food digestion by robbing the rest of the system of needed moisture. A soldier should eat only if he can find enough water to replenish his supply regularly. If there is a choice of types of food, eat carbohydrates; they use the least amount of water to digest. Fats and proteins use the most. Military emergency rations are mostly carbohydrates for this reason.
A soldier finding plant or animal food in the desert should not pass it by if it is easily obtainable. Food is normally hard to come by, but it is very easy to prepare/preserve in the desert. It can usually be saved until water is found. Meat or fruit can easily be cut into strips, wrapped in cloth to protect it from insects and sand, and laid on top of, or just under, the hot desert surface. This process preserves the food, kills any parasites, and makes it more palatable. No cooking is necessary.
Plants and animals are normally found near water. Soldiers finding one of these should be aware that the other is probably near. Animals are not visible at dusk and dawn. If animals are seen in the heat of the day, be alert. Enemy activity or other intruders may have pushed them from hiding.
Attempting to steal food from native villages or camps is difficult. Desert dwellers often have dogs and are likely to be active at night and sleep in the heat of the day. Food is a valuable commodity to poor people, especially in time of war, and is very likely safeguarded against theft. In many desert cultures, all males between puberty and senility carry weapons as a sign of manhood. “Law” may be dispensed rapidly on the spot. This is especially true of isolated mountain people or nomads.
B. Water
Lakes, rivers, streams, or other surface water in rural areas may be contaminated with leptospirosis. Regionally, large leptospirosis outbreaks have been reported, associated with contact with contaminated water sources. Operations or activities that involve extensive water contact may result in personnel being temporarily debilitated with leptospirosis. If unapproved water, as found in many lakes, rivers, streams, and city water supplies, must be used in an emergency, the water may be disinfected by:
Either U.S. military preventive medicine or veterinary personnel should inspect bottled water supplies. Bottled water does not guarantee purity; direct sunlight on bottled water supplies may promote bacterial growth. Water in canals, lakes, rivers, and streams is likely to be contaminated; unnecessary bathing, swimming, and wading should be avoided. If the tactical situation requires entering bodies of water, all exposed skin should be covered to protect from parasites. Following exposure, it is important to dry vigorously and change clothing.
Water will determine how long a soldier can survive in the desert, and its usage must be a consideration in every decision made. All life/activity in the desert is linked to the amount of water available, and needs vary according to temperature and the amount of exertion. Soldiers should procure and consume as much water as possible, at every opportunity.
Conserve body moisture by:
1. Locating Surface Water
Locating water in desert areas requires keen observation. Surface water is usually found after rare rainstorms in the form of intermittent streams and pools of water or water-filled cracks in rocks. Water may take a few weeks to a couple of months to dry up. By looking for logical water collection area indicators, soldiers might be able to locate a surface source.
2. The sun may be used along with plastic to obtain water.
Vegetation bag: This is a large plastic bag in which cut vegetation is placed. The bag is then tied shut and left in the sun. This is the preferred method for soldiers: A vegetation bag can be left on the ground or in a sunny hole in the ground, where the risks of it being noticed are reduced.
Transpiration bag: This is a plastic bag placed over the leafy portion of a branch and then tied. During the hottest part of the day, the plant emits water, which is trapped and condensed in the bag. This is not a preferred method to be used in an evasion situation, since there is a risk the bags will be noticed.
Solar still: This is the least preferable choice, and should be used only in a survival situation, and only if expected to be in the area for more than one day. The effort to construct this device will expend more water than it produces on the first day.
3. Ground (Subsurface) Water
Springs and underground rivers sometimes come to the surface and then disappear into the desert. These areas are usually inhabited oases. The depth of subsurface water can vary widely; it may be just under the surface or over 100 feet deep. Water near the surface might by obtainable by digging in likely spots such as:
Man-made structures, such as wells, cisterns, and Karez (irrigation tunnels) are another potential source of water.
Wells are the major source of water to desert people. They may be 10 to over 100 feet deep. Well users bring their own rope and bucket. These wells are usually located in low places, such as dry rivers, valleys, or at the base of dunes or cliffs.
Cisterns catch and hold water from intermittent streams or run-off from storms. Soldiers encountering ruins can look for old irrigation ditches and follow them uphill from flat places that might have been planted fields at one time. Cisterns are likely to be at the bottom of a dry river bed or canyon and are usually nothing more than brick or rock-lined storage tanks.
All of these manmade subsurface water sources require a long line and some form of bucket to get to the water. Wells in the desert are usually found along trails and can be from 20-30 miles apart. Permanent camps may be 2-3 miles from wells, although nomads sometimes camp very close to a well. Watch for worn paths leading away from camp areas; they may lead to a well. Look for old wells uphill from abandoned homes, farms, or other dwellings. If animal dung and remains of old campfires are noticed, there may be a well nearby. Some people stack animal dung near the wells to dry for use as fuel at a later date.
Well openings may be covered to prevent sand and debris from filling them in. Look for doughnut-shaped mounds, brush, or sand-filled depressions. They may have to be dug out. Be careful not to allow sand or debris to fall down the hole; the water may be very shallow in the bottom of the well.
Finding water is not the only problem facing soldiers. Once found, it must be obtained without being detected. Scout the area and observe the well from a distance. If the enemy knows a soldier is in the area, they may try setting in an ambush at the well. They know the soldier needs water! Look carefully for vehicle tracks; carefully scan any high ground for enemy observers or dust. A water source should be approached during darkness when escape chances are increased if the enemy has set a trap.
When a soldier uses a well, he should get as much water as he can carry and move away from the area as soon as possible. The volume of water carried governs the soldier's range of travel and ability to hide for a length of time if the enemy is near. Further, the next water source may be dried up or inaccessible. Fill all water bags, canteens, and any improvised containers to hold water, such as a poncho, plastic bag lining a rucksack or survival kit container, a condom in a helmet, or pneumatic life preserver bladders. Both the approach and departure from the well should be evasive from one point of concealment to the next. If in a group, post a lookout. Tracks should be brushed out when leaving.
All water should be considered biologically contaminated. If water purification tablets are available, use them. Dysentery and other waterborne diseases can cause severe dehydration. Filtering and aeration might improve the taste and appearance of water. If no purification tablets are available, a soldier still needs the water to live. If boiling is not an option (the smoke, flame, and odor from a fire are very risky in open terrain), clean the water as much as possible by other methods. Allow sediments to settle, then filter the water through cloth, sand, and/or charcoal. Fully aerate (pour the water from one container to another or shake up with top open). Allow contact with direct sunlight.
Water containers need care. Protect them from thorns, grit, abrasions, or sharp rocks, and try to keep them in the shade. Place them where they will not be damaged or destroyed. Protect water and containers from freezing on winter nights, when expanding ice may burst the containers. Keep them close to the body. Be sure rodents cannot gnaw on them.
| Operational Vignette: An Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) crossing by the FWF from Maglaj to the village of Rijecca in the Doboj municipality was coordinated through the mayors of Maglaj and Doboj. The purpose of the crossing was to visit a cemetery. It was agreed that the visit would take place, and another Chief of Police guaranteed the safety of the faction visitors. Coordination by both TFE and NORPOL staffs ensured that the conditions were set to minimize the possibility of a confrontation between the two FWFs. These actions included: positioning of checkpoints along the route to monitor movement and to ensure weapons were not brought into the ZOS; helicopters on standby; and QRFs postured to respond, if necessary. In addition, the IPTF and UNHCR would accompany the visiting factions’ personnel throughout the visitation. When the visitors reached the IEBL, an FWF police force handed the group over to another FWF police force who escorted them to the cemetery. A crowd of 15 other faction personnel were at the site. Four of the other faction individuals instigated an altercation with journalists who were with the visitors. One of the faction individuals fired two shots in the air; the FWF police subdued him and confiscated the weapon. The incident was reported by the IPTF to the TFE TOC. As a result, the DANBN QRF was positioned two kilometers north of the site, a tactical PSYOP team moved to link up with the QRF, a OH58C flew to the location, and the TFE QRF with combat camera crew were put on a 30-minute alert. The OH58C confirmed that FWFs were at the site. The visit resumed, but was later suspended because of rock throwing and increased tension. The FWF police escorted the visitors back to the appropriate side of the faction IEBL. |
Base Defense Techniques
The common tasks associated with successful base defense operations include:
Actions for base defense should be clearly outlined in the base defense SOP. The base defense SOP should be disseminated down to the soldier level ensuring that every soldier understands his part in the base defense plan. Base defense exercises should be conducted regularly to ensure compliance with the SOP. It is too late to discover a flaw in the base defense plan when an actual attack occurs. Units should consider the following when creating or updating base defense SOPs:
Force Protection Levels
Bunkers
Alarms
New/Transient Soldiers and Visitors
Civilians/Local Nationals on Base
Perimeter Security
| There were 51 incidents of unauthorized personnel attempting to penetrate the perimeter of base camps -- 24 were successful. The perpetrators were frequently being identified and detained prior to entering the base camp. This is mostly due to the increased vigilance and situational awareness of guards and patrols in the base camps. The G2 analyzed the incidents, distinguishing no clear trends. However, the geographic concentration of the incidents correlate with local populace needs (trying to acquire foodstuffs) and existing targets of opportunity (if security does not appear to be maintained). Most of the intruders were teenagers. There were no indications of a prospective threat from organized or terrorist elements. |
Alert Procedures
Civilians Inside the Base Camps
Command and Control of the Perimeter Defense
| During a convoy, a vehicle broke down. The convoy did not have the necessary equipment to conduct self-recovery to tow the inoperable vehicle. The convoy commander decided to leave the vehicle with the driver and TC, while the remainder of the convoy (three vehicles) moved to the closest base camp to get assistance. Ultimately, the vehicle and personnel were left at the location overnight. The next day the vehicle was recovered without incident. The purpose of the four-vehicle convoy is to facilitate force protection, deterring ambush and kidnapping. Additionally, the four-vehicle rule provides convoy commanders flexibility. The convoy commander can cross-load personnel from an inoperable vehicle if self-recovery cannot be performed. Another alternative is to leave a vehicle with the element while the remainder of the convoy seeks assistance. Only under the most extreme circumstances should soldiers and a single vehicle be left alone. |
Vehicle Breakdown Procedures During Convoy Operations
Units constantly have convoys on the road, to the point that it seems routine. However, the reality of movement should be anything but routine. Convoys may hit a mine, get lost, lose communications, have an accident, or any number of other unpleasant events.
Actions for vehicle breakdowns during convoys must be wargamed and incorporated in unit standing operating procedures. Units should approach vehicle breakdown procedures as a battle drill with actions being executed sequentially. Units should consider the following actions:
Convoy commanders should ensure that soldiers do not become complacent about convoy operations. Before each convoy, brief the following actions to all members of the convoy:
Units should develop and drill “lost communications” actions. Both the convoy and the unit must have an established drill to regain communications, especially if the convoy is overdue. On one occasion, a convoy was overdue, and the BDE had to send out helicopters and the QRF to regain communication.
Leaders must ensure that soldiers understand and are prepared for the dangers they may encounter when conducting convoys. Special care should be taken to prevent complacency on safety, communications, and readiness issues.