This chapter addresses doctrine for joint theater air and missile defense (JTAMD) operations. It is based on joint publications. Joint operations are the integrated military activities of two or more service components of the US military. Unless stated otherwise, multinational procedures for alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are the same as provided in joint doctrine.
3-2, JTAMD is conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction or neutralization of enemy air and missile forces. JTAMD operations include such measures as the use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns, surface to surface and surface-to-air missiles, air-to surface missiles, elements of information operations (IO), and electronic countermeasures to destroy the air or missile threat both before and after it is launched. Other measures that are taken to minimize the effects of hostile air actions are cover, concealment, dispersion, deception (including electronic), and mobility. Both offensive and defensive actions are involved. Offensive operations range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. Defensive operations are normally conducted near or over friendly forces and are generally in reaction to enemy air activity.
3-4. Air superiority, at the critical time and place, provides friendly forces a more favorable environment in which to perform air, land, sea and space operations. Limiting the enemy's use of its air power increases our potential for success and conserves the fighting force so commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. Because offensive and defensive operations must often rely on the same airspace and resources, they cannot be considered in isolation from each other. The emphasis on either offensive or defensive JTAMD operations will depend on the overall situation and the joint force commander's concept of operations. JTAMD operations affect air, land, and maritime battles, and often cross the boundaries between them.
3-5. The ultimate goal of JTAMD operations is to control the airspace to allow commanders to execute their plans. The two types of complementary and mutually supportive JTAMD operations are offensive operations and defensive operations. Offensive operations are conducted to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and supporting structures and systems as close to their source as possible. They are conducted at a time and place of friendly force choosing rather than in reaction to enemy initiatives. Defensive operations are those defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to attack or penetrate the friendly air environment. Defensive operations are conducted primarily in reaction to enemy air offensive initiatives.
3-8. JTMD is composed of four operational elements: passive missile defense; active missile defense; attack operations; and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) (figure 3-1). Because of the continual advancement and proliferation of TMs, the threat cannot currently be countered by any single technical solution, nor will it likely be in the future. The threat can only be countered by the synergistic performance achieved by coordinating and integrating all four operational elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations.
Figure 3-1. JTMD Operational Elements
3-14. Air defense integration. Conduct of the JTAMD battle requires the integrated operation of all available air defense weapon systems. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the JFC will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander designated the area air defense commander (AADC). Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air and missile defense operations. Air and missile defense operations must be coordinated with air, land, sea, and space resources and operations.
3-22. The JFC establishes guidance and objectives for JTAMD. He uses component commanders, component staff, and joint staff elements to plan, monitor, give advice, coordinate, and execute the overall JTAMD operation. The JFC must define and implement a methodology for joint planning, prioritization of missions and targets, friendly asset protection, and apportionment and allocation of resources. The JFC's concept of operations specifies the objectives and provides guidance for the employment of targeting, attack, and defense forces to conduct JTAMD. Component commanders conduct JTAMD operations under the guidance and in support of the objectives of the JFC.
Component Commanders
3-25. Close coordination among component commanders, the JFC, and the AADC (if designated) is necessary to employ the most appropriate resources and measures to execute JTAMD operations and to ensure a synergistic effort. Component-to-component coordination may be required in some situations as a result of the compressed timeline and short reaction times inherent in joint theater missile defense (JTMD) operations.
3-28. Air defense sensors are normally optimized to perform specific surveillance or control functions. To provide the spectrum of coverage required for air and missile defense operations, a number of complementary systems are necessary. These systems range from a mix of static and mobile equipment to strategic warning systems. Systems are netted to enable the gathering and dissemination of information to all ADA forces under all operational conditions.
3-31. Airborne Early Warning. Airborne sensors serve to overcome range and low-level detection limitations inherent in a surface-based sensor system and are integrated with surface systems. The use of airborne early warning systems will extend detection ranges and consequently increase the time available for reaction. At the same time, friendly positions will not be compromised, and the threats from low-level surprise attacks will be significantly reduced.
3-32. Space Based Warning Systems. Space platforms provide warning of ballistic missile attack and other intelligence information to either national or theater warning systems. Spaced-based systems can provide longer-range warning than airborne or surface-based sensors.
3-33. Intelligence Sources. These may provide indications of imminent hostile activity, potential early warning, and positive hostile identification before detection by the air defense system. The maximum possible use of this information is essential. Host nation intelligence sources may significantly augment US intelligence efforts.
3-34. Logistics and Support Agencies. These provide the continuity and sustainability required to enable the air and missile defense force to accomplish its mission. Adequate and timely support must be planned, coordinated, and executed.
3-35. Civilian and Military Air Control Facilities. Air traffic control facilities in the area of operations may contribute vital information to air and missile defense forces. These capabilities are exploited and, where possible, netted into the command and control system.
3-39. Attack operations. Designation of engagement areas, assignment of areas of operations (AO) and coordination of JTMD attack operations are prescribed by the JFC. The JFC will normally task component commanders for conduct of attack operations against TMs within their assigned AOs. Subordinate commanders control attack resources and coordinate and conduct their operations according to joint doctrine and procedures. The JFACC is normally the supported commander to plan and conduct attack operations against theater missiles that are outside the other component commanders' AOs.
3-40. Effective attack operations require real-time coordination between all component commanders as well as continuous wide-area surveillance over the entire area of responsibility. Coordination of attack operations involves the detection, acquisition, classification, and identification of enemy TMs and the dissemination of the targeting information to the designated attack system for execution.
3-41. Linkages. The C4I system links passive and active missile defense and attack capabilities to provide timely assessment of the threat, rapid dissemination of tactical warning, targeting data, mission assignment, and post-strike assessments to the appropriate JTMD element. The C4I system must provide rapid communications among intelligence assets, fusion and decision-making nodes, warning systems, and weapon systems, to include a capability for rapid coordination with supporting commanders in chief. C4I capabilities should also support the principles of centralized control, decentralized execution, and coordinated efforts by units assigned JTMD tasks.
3-42. Resources. Inherent in effective JTMD operations is an absolute requirement for vertical and horizontal technical and procedural interoperability. This is especially true for the C4I operational elements. JTMD C4I systems, facilities, procedures, and organizations integrate applicable joint and multinational capabilities. The JFC must exercise JTMD C4I interoperability among all components during peacetime joint force and multinational exercises. C4I must fulfill the following requirements:
3-43. Planning. C4I planning begins with the JFC 's estimate of the situation, objectives, and overall concept of operations. Subordinate commanders plan the tasking of their forces and resources based on the commander's guidance and priorities. C4I planning for passive missile defense, active missile defense, and attack operations must be coordinated among all components of the force on a continual basis to ensure complementary efforts and to achieve synergism.
3-44. Planning considerations for C4I of JTMD operations must consider both joint and multinational relationships when addressing the need for near real time response to the threat. The wide range of operations that may be appropriate, the diverse nature of the JTMD elements that must complement each other, and the possible impact of JTMD on other missions and tasks, are all considerations.
3-46. To speed the exchange of essential information, it may be necessary to delineate the extent and type of information given to specific command and control levels. Data transferred between command and control levels to exercise JTAMD tasks calls for automated data processing. The systems should have redundancy and must have a backup capability and procedures to maintain continuity of operations should the primary system fail.
3-49. Theaters may have offensive constraints or limitations, requiring a reactive C4I process. A reactive mode demands extensive preparation and preplanning using continuous IPB to provide critical targeting data. The preparation and planning process within the C4I framework focuses sensor, surveillance, and intelligence management to allow target acquisition and tracking of the enemy air and theater missile systems and supporting operations.
3-51. Launch warnings provide the means to alert and increase the readiness of friendly defensive assets, and for the employment of offensive and passive countermeasures. Increasing the readiness posture includes weapon systems, ISR assets, and command and control nodes for the level of threat activity anticipated.
3-52. Once a launch is observed, the preparation and planning measures provide a capability for concurrent and simultaneous defensive and offensive response.
3-53. An identified enemy missile launch through sensor and surveillance systems keys the C4I process, which uses communications interfaces to provide near real time defensive and offensive attack responses. In-flight threat missile trajectory data are passed in near real time directly to interceptors, point defense, and self-protection systems. Simultaneously, while enemy missiles are in flight, updated enemy launch locations, predicted impact areas, and target data base information are passed to the appropriate command and control centers and offensive systems. Concurrently, launch warnings are provided to all units and commands within the theater.
3-54. Depending on the capabilities of the sensor and surveillance systems, and the sources and quality of the intelligence, cueing of additional systems may be necessary to provide more refined and accurate threat missile data. National or theater sensor and surveillance assets may search areas that will then require more refined ISR by theater and tactical assets. Friendly aerial reconnaissance, ground surveillance systems, and other intelligence assets are rapidly cued to achieve the necessary accuracy for IPB targeting objectives.
3-62. Fighter-interceptor. Fighter aircraft may fly three basic missions:
3-63. Armed Helicopters. Aerial combat is an integral part of the ground commander's scheme of maneuver and may be controlled by either the aviation or ground maneuver force commander. Although it is a self-defense mission, air combat can occur during both offensive and defensive operations. Air combat is inherent in aviation's maneuver role in the reconnaissance and security, attack, and air assault missions and must be linked to the aviation command and control system.
3-64. Surface-to-Air Weapons. Surface-to-air weapons are employed to protect the force. These weapons offer large amounts of firepower and instant responsiveness. For maximum effect, a mix of types of surface-to-air weapons should be employed in an integrated air defense since the optimal capabilities of each weapon system occur at different ranges and altitudes. Surface-to-air systems provide the best overall coverage when their operations are both integrated and coordinated. Integration and coordination ensures both a minimum-risk passage for friendly aircraft and a means to deconflict employment of surface-to-air weapons and fighters.
3-66. Depending on the situation and time available in the area of operations, a variety of actions can be taken to improve the joint force's passive defense posture. These actions include:
3-67. Theater Commanders-in-Chief, with support from USSPACECOM, are responsible for establishing theater event reporting systems to acquire, process, and disseminate warning information to joint force components and host-nation civil authorities. They are also responsible for implementing tactical event system architectures that are integrated with operations and intelligence communications nets. Component commanders are responsible for providing warning to assigned forces. Tactical warning initiates passive defense actions. Warnings are both general (that missile launches are imminent or have occurred) and specific (that specific units or areas are in danger of attack). The Commander-in-Chief’s tactical warning requirements are supported by national and theater intelligence and warning systems.
3-68. The tactical event system (TES) and the joint tactical ground station (JTAGS) are of primary importance for tactical warning of ballistic missile attack. Both are US Space Command (USSPACECOM) assets which support theater tactical warning requirements with near real time warning of ballistic missile launches within the CINC's area of interest.
3-71. Mature Theater. Well-rehearsed TM defense plans and preparations allow forces in a mature theater to transition swiftly from peace to war. TM defense systems must provide timely C4I and target acquisition before hostilities commence. Preparatory activities include IPB, detection of launch platform preparations, and transmission of timely warnings to alert responsible commanders. Passive missile defense preparation should be conducted.
3-72. Forces are organized, threat targets prioritized and assigned, and ROE established to protect assets and provide freedom of maneuver for friendly forces during the peacetime phase. Passive and active missile defense measures are planned.
3-73. Contingency Theater. The availability of TMD active defense from the initiation of the operation in an immature or contingency theater will depend on whether the force must conduct opposed or unopposed force entry operations. During an opposed forced entry, land force TMD efforts may initially be limited to passive defense and attack operations until sufficient active defense assets can be deployed into the lodgment area(s). Naval forces may provide limited active defense of forces and assets in the littoral. Counter-ISR operations are essential to passive defense. Early, detailed advanced planning is fundamental to establishing a credible JTMD capability as quickly as possible. If entry is unopposed, Army TMD active defense forces must be deployed during early entry to protect the ports of debarkation and initial force and logistics concentrations. JTMD requirements are very similar to those of a mature theater. The principal differences are the time to deploy JTMD forces and available JTMD resources.
3-74. Forced entry operations may employ airborne, amphibious, or a combination of air, sea, and land insertion means, supported by space-based systems. Whatever the situation, the TM threat must be addressed and an appropriate defense provided early to counter the threat. During initial phases of amphibious operations the Navy component may have the primary role for providing the defense. As assault forces deploy ashore, land-based systems must be employed and integrated into the TMD. Upon agreement, the primary responsibility for JTMD operations may be passed to forces ashore. During situations in which the Naval forces are in support of land operations, Naval and land-based JTMD operations must be coordinated to ensure unity of effort.
3-75. Since JTMD assets available to the JFC will generally be limited, especially in opposed entry operations, special emphasis should be placed on providing physical security for critical JTMD assets against terrorist and similar threats.
3-77. Air Defense commanders at all echelons plan and monitor execution of TMD activities. Air defense commanders are responsible for the active defense operational element of TMD. Additionally, they are directly involved in passive defense, by providing warning of missile attack within the land component, and possibly the joint force. ADA commanders perform active air and missile IPB, recommend air and TMD intelligence priorities, and recommend TMD attack operations targets.
3-79. A role of active missile defense is to destroy incoming TMs in flight in order to protect selected assets and forces. This includes destroying ballistic missiles, air-to-surface missiles, anti-ship missiles, and cruise missiles as early as possible during their flight trajectory, and enemy aircraft armed with ASMs or CMs before they can be launched. Defensive measures also include those actions that mitigate the effectiveness of targeting and delivery systems through electronic and electronic-optical attack of remote or onboard guidance systems. To create a coherent TM defense, active missile defense operations must complement passive missile defense and attack operations.
3-80. Some appropriate detection and attack systems include space-, air-, land-, and sea-based systems. Space-based data and components must be directly downlinked and integrated with theater assets for such things as IPB, launch warning, launch point prediction, threat classification, impact point prediction, weapons system cueing, communications, damage assessment.
3-81. Incoming missiles are destroyed by surface-to-air missiles during the latter phases of a missile's trajectory. Because an enemy attack may integrate aircraft and missiles, active missile defense must be coordinated with active air defense operations.
3-82. The ability to destroy missiles in flight must be coupled with dynamic and imaginative deployment of defensive systems to prevent the enemy from knowing what is defended. This causes uncertainty and reduces the enemy's expectation of a successful attack. Due to resource limitations, active missile defense operations defend those assets deemed the most important and critical by the JFC and component commanders. The JFC, component commanders, and intermediate commanders establish priorities for TMD and accept risk that the enemy could attack lower priority assets that are not defended. The principal contributors to active missile defense operations include surface-to-air missile systems and aircraft that engage enemy airborne launch platforms.
3-86. Aircraft. Aircraft conduct attack-strike operations against targets on the ground or on/in the sea. They also conduct fighter sweeps and air escort missions to destroy enemy aircraft in flight. Aircraft equipped for antisubmarine operations, electronic warfare, aerial refueling, and surveillance, warning, and control activities also support offensive operations.
3-87. Surface Firepower. Artillery and naval gunfire may be employed against targets. Land-attack cruise missiles may be effective against stationary, soft targets such as unsheltered aircraft or command and control facilities. Surface-to-surface guided missiles, such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), cruise missiles, and unguided rockets, such as Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), may also be used.
3-88. UAVs. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles may be used for attack, surveillance, deception, jamming, decoy, or harassment operations. They can be used against targets or in support of other forces conducting offensive operations.
3-89. SOF. Special operations forces (SOF) normally conduct direct action strikes and collect intelligence. They can also provide terminal guidance for air attacks against enemy airfields, operating bases, and other facilities that support enemy air operations.
3-90. Maneuver Forces. Though the majority of offensive AMD tasks require the use of air and fire support assets, maneuver forces may also contribute. Mechanized or armored units, airborne and air-assault infantry, US Marine amphibious forces, and attack aviation may all be used to attack airfields, forward operating bases, and other offensive AMD targets.
3-92. Attack operations can be preemptive or reactive. A sustained effort is required to reduce the enemy's TM capability and involves the execution of mutually supporting tasks. The detection, acquisition, classification, identification, tracking, and attack tasks are highly dependent on a near real time C4I process and rapid targeting capability. Attack operations use all-source intelligence, missile-warning systems, and air defense radar to locate and target enemy TM systems, their components, and supporting nodes.
3-93. Attack operations are highly dependent upon predictive and developed intelligence. Because it is difficult to detect highly mobile launch systems, a C4I capability should exist to support near real time targeting and attack operations. National sensor systems will normally augment theater air- and ground-based systems to provide warning, impact prediction, and launch point determination. Additionally, intelligence products collected by national sensor systems can assist theater forces to anticipate TM operations and to determine enemy TM unit locations. SOF involvement may be through attack of TM targets by direct action operations or through conduct of special reconnaissance.
3-95. Effective JTMD attack operations requires the integration and coordination of all joint force plans. The JFC may task an organization within his joint staff to integrate component commanders' plans or may delegate this responsibility to a subordinate commander. If established, the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB) may be an integration center for this effort or serve as a JFC-level review mechanism. Because of the mobility of TM systems, the time to acquire, target, and attack TM elements may be very short. Thus, an accelerated execution cycle using the decide-detect-deliver-assess process is required. Based upon pre-established JFC approved priorities and ROE, enemy TM targets are attacked by the most appropriate attack system as soon as detected.
3-96. Commanders continually reassess friendly and enemy dispositions throughout the planning cycle. They use all available intelligence to anticipate enemy attack plans, predict TM system dispositions, and plan appropriate attack responses.