This chapter describes the principles and fundamentals for the employment of the air defense combat function, and the integration of air and missile defense (AMD) capabilities into joint and combined arms operations.
4-2. Combatant commanders seek the synergy inherent in joint operations by synchronizing the complementary combat capabilities of all the components and supporting commands into a unified effort. Participation in joint training exercises and understanding joint doctrine is a prerequisite to joint capability. Commanders must train leaders and units to operate as part of the joint team. Liaison is a vital part of this cohesiveness.
4-3. Forward area based ADA forces support collective security arrangements and operate as part of multinational formations. Additionally, ADA units enhance relationships with regional partners through combined exercises, continual contacts, and liaison.
4-4. ADA forces must be prepared to conduct a number of operations that integrate warfighting and stability and support operations. Robust liaison will facilitate understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.
4-10. At operational and tactical levels of war, freedom to maneuver is crucial to achieving superior combat power. Freedom to maneuver facilitates the ability of land and air forces to shape the battlefield, achieve advantage, set the terms for combat and future operations, and exploit success. Freedom to maneuver is the catalyst that permits land, air, and sea forces to reach their full destructive potential. Combined with the synergistic effect of synchronized surface and air operations, freedom to maneuver ultimately leads to success on the battlefield.
4-11. The ability of any unit at any echelon to maneuver freely on the battlefield centers around reliable logistical support and effective battle command. Friendly forces must anticipate enemy efforts to deny or disrupt freedom to maneuver. Enemy air power represents the most flexible, far-reaching, and destructive threat to friendly operations.
4-12. To retain the freedom to maneuver and to protect critical assets, the joint and multinational forces must not only prevent attacks but also destroy the enemy's ability to attack. The rapid destruction of the enemy's air capability enhances friendly force flexibility and contributes to early victory. Therefore, the counterair and theater missile defense forces must kill enemy air platforms and missiles at the earliest opportunity, consistent with the force's mission. The results are protection of the force from the immediate air threat and reduction of the air and missile threat to future operations.
4-13. All members of the combined arms team must contribute to air and missile defense to achieve success. ADA is the only Army force dedicated to execute air and missile defense operations. Other members of the combined arms team, supported by an accurate and timely air and missile defense early warning and intelligence capability, can support the ADA effort.
4-14. Field artillery units can attack theater missile (TM) launch sites, critical air operation support facilities, and enemy ground-based air defenses. Army aviation, with air combat capabilities, can engage enemy aircraft in self-defense or when the ground force commander determines the need to use aviation in an air defense role. Combined arms elements can also strike deep against air operations support facilities and enemy air defenses. Special operations forces can perform deep offensive and reconnaissance operations to cripple and disrupt missile and air operation facilities. Other combined arms units can use organic weapons in self-defense against selected air targets. Smoke units can conceal large areas or restrict contour flight approaches.
4-15. Combat arms, combat support, and combat service support branches participate in the air and missile defense mission directly or indirectly. Combat service support units provide the personnel and material to carry out the mission. Engineer units provide terrain analysis, fortification construction, and assistance in rapid displacement and emplacement of ADA units.
4-16. The US Army focuses on the counterair and theater missile defense missions from a different perspective than other services. Within the Army, each echelon of command views the focus of these missions differently. At echelons above corps, the focus tends toward theater-level counterair and TMD objectives. At division and below, the focus shifts increasingly toward providing freedom to maneuver by protecting the force. These perspectives relate directly to the different battlefield characteristics and requirements at each command level.
4-17. At theater level the commander must control the airspace to protect strategic forces and geopolitical assets, the loss of which would imperil the conduct of the campaign. Corps commanders exercise control over most of the ground forces in the theater. Objectives of air and missile defense at the corps level are protecting the force, providing freedom to maneuver, controlling the air environment, and destroying enemy air and missile power on the ground and in flight.
4-18. Because the division commander is primarily concerned with tactical-level operations, the requirement for divisional air defense focuses on protecting the force. The division must be free to maneuver to shape the battlefield and destroy the enemy.
4-22. Theater commanders participate in national, alliance, and coalition discussions as the theater military experts. They design the theater campaign plan so that it relates to both national strategies and operational activities. The theater campaign plan sets the desired end state and theater-strategic goals and is the basis for operational-level planning. Combatant and subordinate commanders usually plan and execute campaigns. Combatant commanders have strategic intents, concepts, and objectives.
4-23. National missile defense (NMD) is inherently a strategic operation. Satellite defense, depending on the expected outcome, may also be a strategic operation conducted by U.S. Space Command. Defense against air and missile attacks that originate outside the CINC's battlespace may be theater-strategic operations.
4-24. Defense of theater-strategic forces and geopolitical assets may also fall into the strategic level of war. Many stability and support operations are strategic-level. Since casualties may be a critical vulnerability that could impact on national resolve, ADA units are just as critical then as they are during war.
4-25. Echelons above corps (EAC) air defense commands such as the Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) may participate in strategic or theater-strategic planning and execution. Depending on the nature of the operation, corps ADA brigades and divisional battalions may also become involved in strategic or theater-strategic planning and execution.
4-27. Army air and missile defense commands, EAC ADA brigades, and corps ADA brigades usually plan and execute at the operational level of war. In some situations, ADA battalions are employed to protect operational forces and assets.
4-31. The combatant commander’s single unifying campaign plan synchronizes actions taken at each level of war against the threat. The intent is to destroy or disrupt the enemy's key capabilities and functions and exploit the resulting advantage before the enemy can react. Commanders at all levels require vision to fight simultaneously and to respond to contingency requirements. Subordinate service and functional commanders prepare operations plans with supporting actions and operational and tactical objectives that embody the strategic objectives given in the CINC’s campaign plan.
4-38. Branches are contingency plans or options built into the basic plan for changing the disposition, orientation, or direction of movement, and for accepting or declining battle. They give commanders flexibility by anticipating enemy reactions that could alter the basic plan.
4-39. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation. Executing a sequel will normally mean beginning another phase of the campaign. This is a continuous process during an operation so that the commander always has options.
4-41. Deception operations can be planned at all levels and must support the higher headquarters deception plan. In some cases, strategic and operational plans may include the employment of operational and tactical forces without their commanders being aware of the deception effort. Tactical deception may relate to smaller or more localized areas or forces where actions indirectly deceive the enemy as to exactly when, where, how, or who will accomplish the missions.
4-42. Many ADA units have unique and powerful signatures. Since ADA units are vital to force protection, they may be frequently deployed and employed in support of deception operations. Equally important, whenever possible ADA units should take actions that deceive threat RSTA as to their own locations and capabilities.
4-44. ADA commanders and leaders must conduct some form of rehearsal with their units. They must also participate in the rehearsal of the supported units. Time management must be utilized to accomplish both tasks.
4-46. A swift end to the conflict will partially negate the opportunity to employ these weapons. Still, force protection is an imperative in this environment. Effective air and missile defense is crucial. Commanders implement defensive principles of avoidance, protection, and decontamination. Commanders also take offensive preventive measures such as raids, air attacks, and operations designed to locate and neutralize such weapons.
4-47. ADA units provide for the protection of the force and geopolitical assets from many forms of chemical or biological air or missile attack. In order to provide such protection, ADA soldiers must be prepared to survive, fight, and win under conditions produced by weapons of mass destruction.
4-49. US joint doctrine establishes a framework wherein joint forces can apply combat power simultaneously throughout the land, sea, air, and space dimensions of the theater. US Army doctrine also prefers such a framework. Selecting choices to comply with that framework is the business of tactical- and operational-level commanders and staffs. See FM 100-5 for a detailed discussion of the operational framework and battlefield organization concepts.
4-51. During stability and support operations commanders-in-chief can focus their efforts through the designation of an AO. If required, the AO may be further subdivided by delineating a joint operations area (JOA), joint zone (JZ), or joint special operations area (JSOA).
4-52. During war a commander-in-chief achieves focus through the designation of theaters-of-war (figure 4-1). Within that theater, single or multiple theaters of operation can be formed. Multiple theaters of operation are formed when there are multiple major threats. A JSOA can also be designated. The JSOA within the theater of war can overlap into the theater of operations.
Figure 4-1. Theater Structure Diagram
4-54. Nation assistance and similar activities do not cease when higher levels of violence begin. The theater environment is often one of simultaneous activities across the full range of military operations.
4-55. The theater commander could also establish a combat zone (CZ) and communications zone (COMMZ). The CZ is an area required by combat forces to conduct operations. It normally extends forward from the corps rear boundary. The COMMZ constitutes the rear portion of a theater of operations, reaching back to the CONUS base or perhaps to another combatant commander's AOR. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communications (LOC), and other agencies required to support forces in the field. The COMMZ includes air and seaports that support the flow of forces and material into the theater. It is usually contiguous to the CZ but may be separate and connected only by a thin LOC.
4-57. Army doctrine describes the structure of modern warfare and recognizes its inherent three-dimensional nature. Synchronizing ground operations with air operations is the bedrock on which this doctrine is based.
4-60. A campaign plan reflects the JFC's translation of national and alliance or coalition strategies into a theater military strategy. The campaign plan expresses operational military objectives that support the theater strategy, and it defines those objectives in terms of desired results of combat operations. The campaign plan also expresses the commander's mission priorities and decisions regarding apportionment of the resources of component air, land, and sea forces. Through the theater campaign plan, the JFC states the intent and provides a blueprint for conducting the early phases of the campaign. The plan also provides a general concept for follow-on campaign operations and contains campaign sustainment guidance.
4-61. Component commanders assist in preparing theater campaign plans and develop mutually supporting and synchronized air, land, and sea operations plans. Their plans implement the theater commander's guidance as it affects the employment of their respective forces. The JFC ensures the supporting plans embody the theater campaign objectives and provide for maximum combat power at the right place and time. Synchronization and unity of effort are the principal benefits of the JFC's review and integration of the supporting operations plans into the theater campaign plan.
4-63. The Army's role in the theater campaign is also multidimensional and requires combined arms. The Army's combat functions directly support land operations and also support air operations. For example, the air defense combat function, for which ADA is both the proponent and principal contributor, is the Army's primary means to integrate Army contributions to joint counterair and theater missile defense operations. The campaign planning linkages depicts an example of integrated Army and Air Force support that is required to conduct the theater campaign (figure 4-2).
Figure 4-2. Campaign Planning Linkages
4-70. Attack operations may be factored into OCA, but can be accomplished in other mission areas such as interdiction. After joint and Army AMD forces have established air superiority, the JFC can reduce the apportionment of capabilities and forces to counterair. These assets can then be tasked in support of other air, sea, and ground operations.
4-72. Projecting the force anywhere in the world is a joint mission and total Army mission that involves active and reserve component units, the mobilization base, and Department of the Army civilians. It includes the mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of the employed force; and the redeployment and demobilization of the force in preparation for future missions. ADA units should not expect to move smoothly from one stage to the next stage of force projection operations.
4-73. Force projection is a complex process in which each action affects many others. Deployed forces and lines of communications require protection. The intelligence community may only have general information about a contingency area. Host nation support may be unknown. Missions might change at any point. Despite the complexity of force-projection operations, ADA units must execute them successfully.
4-77. Commanders find they may need to substitute one type of ADA unit for another or to add ADA units that have never trained together. This places a premium on early and continuous teamwork that builds the cohesion that is essential for mission success. Units must standardize tactics, techniques, and procedures to enhance teamwork and total force integration. ADA commanders must select a force composition appropriate for the mission, build the team, and plan for simultaneous deployment and rapid employment of the ADA force.
4-79. The following principles are critical to Intelligence and Electronic Warfare operations:
4-80. Intelligence must support the air defense commander during all phases of the decision-making process. During planning the commander at each level drives the intelligence effort. They initially drive intelligence through the identification of priority intelligence requirements (PIR). Each commander must broker subordinate commanders' intelligence requirements, after which, intelligence assets are tasked to meet those requirements.
4-82. ADA commanders must have robust battle command means during force projection. They must accurately track friendly forces and forecast their arrival in theater. Space-based systems can greatly facilitate the commander's near-real-time knowledge of unit status and other key assets, as well as connecting into joint and multinational counterair and theater missile defenses. Establishing adequate communications networks will require innovation. Communications must be secure, reliable, timely, and compatible with the mix of supporting, supported, and adjacent forces and services. ADA units must rapidly establish communications with other organizations and services in the operation.
4-86. Multinational counterair and missile defense requirements must be incorporated into the overall plan. Likewise, multinational capabilities must be maximized during operations.
4-90. ADA commanders should assume no set arrangement of events. They should be prepared to deal with many concurrent activities. They should conceptualize a logical flow through the stages but be prepared to make adjustments. The stages of force projection include the following:
4-92. Mobilization includes five levels, which support mobilization for specific or limited contingencies up to the full mobilization necessary to support large, protracted wars. The mobilization flow for an RC unit consists of planning, alert, activities at home station, activities at mobilization station, and activities at the port of embarkation. ADA commanders anticipating augmentation by RC units or individuals must be involved in providing training guidance and mobilization planning during the planning and alert phases. During the remaining phases, commanders must be prepared to receive units and/or individuals, organize personnel, supplies, and materiel, certify the proficiency of individuals and units and deploy the units into theater.
4-93. ADA commanders must be involved in the mobilization process because of the current reliance on the RC. In nearly every contingency, RC units and individuals are relied upon to accomplish the mission. Details of the mobilization process are in FM 100-17.
4-95. Task organization is conducted based on the mission and resources available. The theater campaign plan will specify command, intelligence, logistics, and any multinational operations relationships, if known. The G2 or S2 must begin a detailed IPB as early as possible to support planning. Anticipatory logistics planning during this stage is key to successful execution of later stages. Operations security is critical during this stage. The combatant or joint force commander will establish the sequence in which Army units should deploy relative to the movement of forces of the other services. ADA commanders must prioritize deployment sequences consistent with METT-TC. ADA commanders use available time to complete training and certification as well as building team cohesion. For forward presence forces, it may be necessary to provide air defense force protection and counter-RSTA during this stage.
4-97. ADA commanders are responsible to provide forces protection during deployment. They must tailor the force to accomplish the mission against the threat developed during IPB. They may have to sacrifice mobility, redundant communications, and sustainability to bring in sufficient firepower to protect the force and designated assets during the initial phases of the deployment. Counter-RSTA will also be a significant part of the responsibilities of the ADA commanders, especially with respect to UAVs. Protection of joint air and missile defense priorities may outweigh defense of service priorities.
4-99. Continuous intelligence support is critical. Entry force commanders will have in-flight intelligence during deployment and entry operations. Once on the ground, a deployable intelligence support element (DISE) will provide split-based intelligence operations by bringing together communications capabilities, automated intelligence fusion systems, and broadcast downlinks in a scalable, deployable package.
4-100. Even as entry operations are beginning, the commander shifts focus to building up capabilities in preparation for operations. Entry operations include rapid buildup and expansion that may require the following:
4-101. ADA forces provide the requisite force protection, in coordination with other joint and multinational air and missile defense elements. Early deployment of counter-missile and counter-RSTA ADA units is crucial to the success of entry operations. Even in an apparently benign entry operation, protection of the force remains a critical command consideration. Theater missile defense operations protect the lodgment, geopolitical assets, and debarking forces. Counter-RSTA operations deny the enemy targeting information, which is key to the enemy sustaining an effective air or missile attack. Units conducting counter-RSTA operations may need to be deployed away from the force to achieve early engagement. As the joint force expands the lodgment, ADA units continue to protect the force and geopolitical assets and deny threat RSTA throughout the AO. This is particularly critical to deceiving the enemy on the US intended course of action.
4-103. Six imperatives must be achieved in order for units to successfully conduct RSOI operations. The six RSOI Imperatives are as follows:
4-104. RSOI requires home-station training to be successful and is imperative to effective force projection operations. RSOI is the means by which commanders shape and expedite force closure in the theater of operations. Effective, well-conceived RSOI operations greatly speed force closure; conversely, an ineffective RSOI delays force closure and compromises the CINC’s ability to implement the concept of operations.
4-106. Army commanders normally seek to engage threat forces simultaneously throughout the depth of the AO. The commander weights the main effort with sufficient, sustained combat power to win the decisive battles and allocates enough combat power to supporting efforts to ensure overall victory. Force agility, initiative, and synchronized operations throughout the width and depth of the battlefield characterizes ADA operations. Counter-RSTA and force protection remains crucial to the multinational, joint, and Army commanders' plans. Commanders conduct their operations with a sound logistical foundation integrated with their concept of combat operations. Countering helicopters increases in importance during the operations phase. Ensuring freedom to maneuver and minimizing casualties for the force are two of the primary objectives of air defense.
4-107. ADA commanders must use the same types of planning processes used by the supported force. This facilitates understanding and synchronization. Naturally the factors which go into the planning process for ADA units will be task organized to their mission and capabilities. ADA commanders use employment principles and guidelines to design air and missile defenses. When applying these principles and guidelines, planners must consider the tactical and technical capabilities of each weapon and sensor system as well as the relevant factors of METT-TC, IPB, and the air and missile defense priorities.
4-109. Mass is the concentration of air and missile defense combat power. It is achieved by assigning enough firepower to successfully defend the force or the asset against air and missile attack or surveillance. To mass air and missile defense combat power, commanders may have to accept risks in other areas of the battlefield.
4-110. Mix is the employment of a combination of weapon and sensor systems to protect the force and assets from the threat. Mix offsets the limitations of one system with the capabilities of another and complicates the situation for the attacker. All joint and multinational arms resources are considered when applying this principle. Proper mix causes the enemy to adjust their tactics. Enemy tactics designed to defeat one system may make the enemy vulnerable to another friendly system.
4-111. Mobility is the capability to move from place to place while retaining the ability to perform the air defense mission. The mobility of air and missile defense resources must be equivalent to the mobility of the supported force. First priority for mobility should be planning moves that support accomplishment of the mission. Tactical situations may dictate additional moves to enhance survivability. Strategic mobility is essential to support force-projection operations.
4-112. Integration is the close coordination of effort and unity of action, which maximizes operational effectiveness. It is applicable, regardless of command relationships established. Active air and missile defense operations must be integrated into the supported commander's concept of the operation. The AD plan describes vertical and horizontal integration of air defense systems across the width and depth of the battlefield and includes integration with joint and multinational forces.
Figure 4-3. ADA Employment Guidelines
4-115. Overlapping fires are achieved by positioning weapons so their engagement envelopes overlap. Because of the many altitudes from which the enemy can attack or conduct RSTA operations, the defense planner must apply mutual support or overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.
4-116. Balanced fires are achieved by positioning weapons to deliver an equal volume of fire in all directions. This may be necessary when air defense is used in an area where the terrain does not canalize the enemy, or when the air avenue of approach is not predictable.
4-117. Weighted coverage is achieved by combining and concentrating fires toward the most likely threat air avenues of approach or direction of attack. Based on the tactical situation, a commander may risk leaving one direction of attack unprotected or lightly protected to weight coverage toward another direction.
4-118. Early engagement is achieved by positioning sensors and weapons so they can engage the threat before ordnance release or target acquisition. Ideally, ADA should engage and destroy the enemy before it can fire on or acquire the defended asset or force.
4-119. Defense in depth is achieved by positioning sensors and weapons so the air threat will come under an increasing volume of fire as it approaches the protected asset or force. Defense in depth lowers the probability that the enemy will reach the defended asset or force.
4-121. Criticality. Criticality is the degree to which an asset or force is essential to mission accomplishment. Determination of the criticality of an asset or force is made by assessing the impact on the conduct of the operation that would result from damage to the asset or force. The degree of criticality is based on whether damage to the asset or force prevents, seriously interferes with, or causes only limited interference with the execution of the plan.
4-122. Vulnerability. Vulnerability is the degree to which an asset or force is susceptible to surveillance and attack or to damage if attacked. When assessing vulnerability consideration should be given to the following factors about the asset or force:
4-123. Recuperability. Recuperability is the degree to which an asset or force can recover from inflicted damage in terms of time, equipment, and available manpower to continue its mission. The ADA commander considers the time to replace soldiers, equipment, or entire units, as well as whether a different element can perform the same mission. Assessment of geopolitical assets is provided by coordination with civil authorities.
4-124. Threat. The probability of an asset or force being targeted for surveillance or attack by enemy air must be assessed as part of the threat. The use of threat information to develop AD priorities is a reverse IPB process--what we expect enemy air to survey and attack, based on IPB. Targeting information provided by intelligence estimates, past enemy surveillance and attack methods, and threat doctrine is useful in evaluating air and missile defense priorities. To determine the relative importance of assets and forces, the ADA commander considers certain characteristics that make an asset or force a lucrative target for the enemy. In effect, this is reverse target value analysis.
4-126. However, the post-conflict stage may be interrupted by the resumption of hostilities. Thus, units must rapidly consolidate, reconstitute, train, and prepare to remain in theater should the fighting resume. During this time, force protection is vital to prevent isolated attacks. ADA forces concentrate on providing force security and preventing surprise, permitting unimpeded reconstitution and facilitating unopposed embarkation of forces that are no longer needed in theater. Air and missile defense forces may remain in theater after the end of hostilities to perform stability and support operations.
4-128. Protection of the force during redeployment is as critical as during deployment or any other stage of the operation. While the most significant aerial attack capabilities may have been eliminated, air and missile defense forces must be prepared to counter desperation or retaliatory air and missile attacks.
4-129. Reconstitution activities can begin in theater prior to redeployment. They include rebuilding unit integrity and accounting for soldiers and equipment. If the force has been exposed to nuclear, chemical, or biological contaminants, reconstitution activities may include thorough decontamination of personnel and equipment. These activities continue after arrival at home station with the focus on the rebuilding of units back to pre-mobilization levels of readiness, regeneration of logistics stockpiles, and the accountability of mobilized equipment and supplies.