This chapter provides doctrine for Army ADA battle command. It addresses the responsibilities of the commander and some aspects of command and control as it relates to battle management. It also addresses the command systems capabilities necessary to help the commander to integrate and coordinate functions and execute successful operations. Battle command is a vital factor in executing the tenets of Army operations, surviving, and winning quickly and decisively on future battlefields or in stability and support operations.
5-2. Commanders assess; conduct risk assessment and risk management; and see, hear, and understand the needs of subordinates and seniors. Commanders go where they can best influence the battle, where their moral and physical presence can be felt, and where their will to achieve victory can best be expressed, understood, and acted upon.
5-5. A commander cannot know everything. However, he must know that which is important. The battle command system must provide him a solid base of information from which he can pick and choose what he needs. The commander must glean the information he knows to be vital from what is available and provided by others. He bears personal responsibility for defining the critical information, friendly or enemy, he must have. The commander cannot be a prisoner of a command post. He must retain access to the information he needs to command from wherever he is on the battlefield.
5-6. Battle command demands that leaders position themselves where they can best command without depriving them of the ability to respond to changing situations. The commander must be able to go where he can best assess the operation and risks and make the necessary adjustments.
5-7. Battle command demands that the commander retain his objectivity when making decisions and not be swayed by the passions of the moment. The successful commander requires a balanced detachment from the unimportant, with an instinctive recognition of what is important and what requires his direct involvement. The commander cannot attempt to address personally every action. Knowing what requires his attention and what his staff and subordinate commanders can handle is key to time management and a decentralized command environment.
5-9. A commander's strength of character and ability to motivate are among the most vital components of successful command. The commander serves as a role model. He promotes the proper ethical perspectives, sustains a positive and progressive command climate, and fosters a sense of organizational unity and cohesion. Commanders are technically and tactically proficient and possess the moral toughness that provides soldiers the will to fight.
5-11. Battle commanders must be flexible enough to respond to changing situations and to anticipate the demands of, and solutions to, future operations. They must train themselves, their staffs, soldiers and units so that they are prepared for whatever missions they are assigned. Commanders must be able to visualize the future, formulate concepts, allocate means, and direct the necessary missions required for achieving victory.
5-12. Commanders make estimates of future operations and assessments of the current situation to determine their own intent and formulate the concept of the operation. The prioritization of actions and considerations of the acceptable degree of risk guides the commander in determining the amount of control he can, and should, delegate to others to synchronize actions across the area of operations. Command without freedom of action to subordinates denies their initiative and lessens the ability of the battle commander to employ all of his resources to their fullest potential.
5-14. Control provides the commander freedom to operate, to delegate authority, and lead from any position on the battlefield, while synchronizing actions vertically and horizontally throughout the AO. Control derives from understanding the commander's intent, implementing good SOPs, training units and soldiers prior to battle, rehearsing, using graphic control measures specific to the situation, and maintaining continuous dialogue between commanders at all levels. Proper control ensures all operations are synchronized and sustained throughout their duration. The process of controlling an organization is directed towards ensuring that the efforts of all elements are synchronized, adjusting as the situation dictates. However, focus must be maintained on the intended end state and purpose as expressed in the commander's intent. Skilled staffs work within the commander's intent to direct and control units and allocate the means to support that intent.
5-15. A staff’s role is defined and focused by the commander. The staff and subordinates assist the commander in developing, modifying, and improving the initial versions of courses of action based on their expertise.
5-16. The staff performs the fact-filtering and development work. But when completed, it is the commander who makes the judgment-informed decisions. It is through the staff and battle command systems that the commander exercises control. Staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. They monitor the status of organizations, identify variance, correct deviations, and push analyzed information to the commander. Staffs acquire and apply means to carry out the commander's intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance.
5-17. Control provides the means to regulate, to synchronize, and to monitor forces and functions through collection, fusion, assessment, and dissemination of information and data. Control is associated with functional areas and depends upon data and information systems. It allows the commander through the staff to monitor the status and efforts of the command and adjacent units and to maintain situation awareness throughout the battlespace. Responsive control means (communications, computers, and sensors) allow the commander to manage and direct the process.
5-18. The communications segment of the battle command and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems must provide information quickly and with reasonable security, to whomever needs it. Information transfer between sensors and weapon systems or forces is necessary in every type and level of battle management. Information-age technology can provide the commander an abundance of near-real-time information that can, if properly presented, reduce uncertainty and confusion. However, if improperly managed, it could burden the commander.
5-19. Speed of operations has quickened because of advances in the rate of intelligence and information flow. The ability to gather, manage, process, and circulate near-real-time information among sensors, weapons, and highly mobile forces give operational and tactical commanders the means to set battle tempo. Tempo is a function of speed of operations within time to accomplish missions based on the commander's plan and available resources.
5-20. Tempo requires both mental and physical agility by leaders and organizations. Commanders must understand these relationships and manage them effectively. Commanders must possess the mental agility and discipline to make timely decisions to modify the tempo to their advantage, deny the enemy the initiative, and decisively defeat it at the selected time and place.
5-22. Reliable communications are imperative to battle command and control. Effective battle command requires reliable signal support systems to enable the commander to conduct operations at varying tempos over extended distances. Good signal planning increases the commander's options to exploit success and facilitate future operations. The battle command style of the commander dictates the structure of his supporting communications system. The commander is able to move freely about the battlefield and is electronically linked with the command post to access time-sensitive data and to influence the battle. Space-based systems provide commanders with communications, reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, navigation and positioning information, early warning, and weather, terrain, and environmental monitoring (WTEM) that greatly facilitate battle command. Satellite communications support all battlefield operating systems. These space-based systems significantly enhance the speed and accuracy of information that commanders exchange with subordinates. For more details on space operations, see appendix C.
5-25. The coordination function implements the coordination and cooperation actions required to develop, distribute, and execute the plan. The directives and orders function promulgates the plan in a timely manner. The monitoring and controlling function observes and records activities taken in response to orders issued and performs alerting based on the situation. The routine staff function supports the overall battle command process. Predictive EO algorithms will use FO information from the situation analysis function as the basis for recommending or directing EO activities.
5-28. Commanders must determine and specify the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) that are needed to understand the battlefield and the flow of operations. CCIR consists of three types of information: priority intelligence requirements (PIR), friendly force information requirements (FFIR), and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). The commander must focus the organization and battle command systems to give the information needed to conduct the estimate and refine the assessment driven by time or event. The commander must, however, still be prepared to make decisions and accept risk without complete information, recognizing that waiting for complete information may result in lost opportunities to act. Too much information can paralyze a force as quickly as too little data if the commander is hesitant to act in ambiguous situations. The commander must tell the staff what information is important to collect. Whatever factors are present, the commander is personally responsible for establishment of the commander's critical information requirements.
5-29. Once the commander has the necessary information, he must possess the creativity and intuition to visualize the flow of events toward a future state. The commander formulates a concise expression of how elements of the command will operate together to accomplish their operational responsibilities and missions.
5-30. Commanders must be able to convey to subordinates a clear, concise statement of the commander’s intent for future operations, which includes the purpose; what tasks and when they want those tasks accomplished; and the desired end-state. Their concept of the operation must include an overall scheme of operations, the necessary interfaces and coordination, the sequence from one phase to another, and the priorities and risks the commander is willing to take. Connectivity must exist between current operations and the branches and sequels of the future plan. While a portion of this future state may be directed by a higher level commander's intent, the commander must possess the ability to envision the organization's future state within its battle space.
5-31. Techniques and procedures may vary, but planning and executing operations are continuous and concurrent activities. Commanders must master time-space-resource-purpose relationships and understand the ways they affect friendly and enemy capabilities to achieve success in battle. They must be able to orchestrate all functions affecting their battle space: intelligence, fires, forces positioning, resources, deception, and timing. In addition, they must have a personal awareness of the battle to influence the tempo and impact of the operation. Commanders make necessary adjustments to current operations and possible modifications of future operations through interactions with other commanders and staffs as well as their own staffs.
5-32. Decision-making and problem solving are not done in isolation. However, the commander must determine which decisions designated subordinates may make. Typical decisions retained by commanders are for changes in intent, mission, concept of operations, priorities (main effort, air or missile defense), or major reallocation of resources.
5-34. Corps and divisional ADA units accomplish the majority of tactical air and missile defense missions. The corps ADA brigade and the divisional ADA battalion, respectively, are the corps and division commanders' primary air and missile defense resources (figure 5-1). The corps commander's requirement to provide air and missile defense resources to forces is no different from the requirement to provide maneuver and fire support resources. The corps commander must ensure that forces at all levels have air defense protection and must reinforce those defenses when necessary. Of particular importance is the corps commander's requirement to provide high–to–medium altitude (HIMAD) ADA protection to divisions, with specific emphasis on giving support to offensive operations. The division commanders require corps support for high–to–medium altitude (HIMAD) air defense and any additional SHORAD weapons needed for mission accomplishment.
Figure 5-1. ADA Brigade Commander Functions
5-36. The AMDCOORD also coordinates with ADA elements at higher and lower echelons, as well as with adjacent units. Coordination ensures vertical and horizontal integration of ADA coverage throughout the battlefield. For example, the corps AMDCOORD integrates corps ADA with theater, division, and adjacent corps ADA forces. In force-projection operations, this will include integration with joint or multinational counterair and theater missile defense participants. The division AMDCOORD ensures the air defense plan interfaces with the corps and adjacent division air defense plans.
5-38. The TAAMDCOORD contributes the majority of the joint force surface-to-air missile forces as the commander of the highest echelon AD command in the theater. He deploys resources in the combat and communications zones and influences tactical operations by shifting the ADA force between these two areas based on the concept of the operation (figure 5-2).
Figure 5-2. TAAMDCOORD Functions
5-40. The DAADC, combined with a robust AAMDC liaison team to support the AADC/DAADC relationship, provides the following support to the AADC:
5-41. Although the AAMDC commander may serve as a "deputy" AADC, it is not envisioned that the DAADC would assume the role of the AADC if the AADC were incapacitated. The DAADC is not a true deputy commander in that sense. The DAADC's primary responsibilities are to assist the AADC in planning, coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing land-based AD and TMD systems. Neither the AAMDC commander nor his staff has the tactical, technical, or procedural expertise and capability to perform all of the DCA functions of an AADC in a joint environment.
5-44. EAC brigades will deploy early into the theater to protect APODs, SPODs, early arriving forces and critical supplies. As entry forces move into tactical assembly areas (TAA) for expansion operations, ADA forces maneuver and reposition to provide optimized forces protection. As the lodgment is expanded ADA forces conduct combat operations to protect critical political, communications, transportation, and military forces. As deployment operations conclude, EAC ADA brigades and multinational forces will form a cohesive integrated defense from which to conduct military operations.
5-45. Units conducting active defense at theater level normally consist of one or more EAC ADA brigades that provides command and control over assigned forces. The brigade commander task organizes active defense forces to protect selected priority assets, designated by the AAMDC commander, from the DAL.
5-49. Command posts must support the commander wherever he is. They must provide assured access to timely, accurate, and relevant information through integrated, interoperable digitized links with all echelons, other services, other government agencies, and multinational forces. Command posts must also provide the commander with the ability to respond to changing circumstances from any point within or outside the battlespace while moving or stationary.
5-50. Command posts are organized to perform the following functions:
Table 5-1. Command Relationships
| Inherent Responsibilities | ||||||||
| Relationship with: | Task organized by: | Receives logistics from: | Positioned by: | Provides liaison: | Maintains commo with: | Priorities established by: | Gaining unit can further impose: | |
| Attached | Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit | Per Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit | Attached, OPCON, TACON, GS, GSR, R, DS |
| OPCON | Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit (see note) | Parent Unit | Gaining Unit | Per Gaining Unit | Parent unit and Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit | OPCON, TACON, GS, GSR, R, DS |
| TACON | Gaining Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Gaining Unit (maneuver) | Per Gaining Unit | Parent unit and Gaining Unit | Gaining Unit | GS, GSR, R, DS |
| NOTE: Except when involving Multinational forces in NATO, then Parent Unit. | ||||||||
Table 5-2. Support Relationships
| Inherent Responsibilities | ||||||||
| Relationship with: | Task organized by: | Receives logistics from: | Positioned by: | Provides liaison: | Maintains commo with: | Priorities established by: | Gaining unit can further impose: | |
| GS | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Per Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | NA |
| GS-R | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Per Parent Unit and reinforced unit | Parent Unit and reinforced unit | 1. Parent
unit 2. Reinforced unit |
NA |
| R | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Reinforced unit | Reinforced unit | Parent Unit and reinforced unit | 1. Reinforced unit 2. Parent Unit |
NA |
| DS | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Parent Unit | Supported Unit | Supported Unit | Parent Unit and Supported Unit | Supported unit | NA |
5-66. This representation provides horizontal and vertical coordination to the various elements of the joint force. These staff elements include intelligence, fire support, EW, Air Force staff, Army aviation, Navy and or USMC air control systems, maneuver, and the Army airspace command and control (A2C2) cell at all echelons of command. Staff coordination is possible due to the battle command structure that integrates the combat functions. The combat functions provide an interface among all staff elements at each level of command. The result is a vertical and horizontal integration of staff activity that serves to unify the effort of the force at all echelons.
5-68. The AAMDC provides the staff and equipment to plan, coordinate, deconflict, and monitor the execution of theater air and missile defense during joint and multinational operations. The AAMDC has dedicated liaison teams that can deploy to all major theater and ARFOR elements to integrate ARFOR air defense and TMD operations. Elements that the AAMDC deploys liaison teams to include the following:
5-69. The AAMDC normally deploys a robust liaison team to the AADC location to support the DAADC and the AADC. The liaison team is lead by an ADA Colonel (O6) when the DAADC is not present and may consist of active defense, attack operations, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) experienced personnel to execute 24-hour AMD operations.
5-70. If the AAMDC is not in theater, the senior ADA organization in the theater is responsible to provide liaison to the land component commander, the battlefield coordination detachment, and the area air defense commander. It may also find it necessary to send liaison teams to the air operations headquarters of other services or multinational forces. In addition, liaison teams may also be required at other combat function locations, for logistics or intelligence, for example.
5-71. Corps ADA brigade commanders may provide liaison to the CRC and all CPs of the corps and to selected major subordinate commands. In some cases, it may even be necessary to send liaison teams to divisions to supplement the divisional AMDCOORD.
5-72. ADA battalion commanders provide liaison to the supported forces or to the headquarters of the force in whose area they are operating. Dedicated liaison teams are provided to each committed and defended maneuver brigade task force or equivalent level force. ADA commanders as AMDCOORD may supplement or replace liaison teams. At battalion task force level and below, liaison teams are not provided on a dedicated basis. ADA leaders perform duties as AMDCOORD, ADA commander, and AD staff officer. Liaison manning should be adjusted as new information systems are implemented and liaison requirements change.
5-75. Airspace control measures afford the ACA the means to procedurally or positively control all airspace users. Airspace control measures are rules to reserve airspace for specific users, restrict actions of airspace users, control actions of specific airspace users, or require airspace users to accomplish specific actions. The ACA implements the airspace control measures through the theater airspace control plan and specific directives. The AMDCOORD and A2C2 element at each echelon provide Army requirements to the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) at the joint air operations center for incorporation into the airspace control plan.
5-76. Identification is an important function of airspace control in air and missile defense operations. Hostile and friendly identification ensures timely engagement of targets and reduces the potential for fratricide. The tactical situation, electronic interference, or equipment malfunction may preclude positive friendly identification, but airspace control measures provide a procedural backup. From an ADA perspective, many airspace control measures provide a means of probable friendly identification and default hostile identification. These measures allow friendly forces optimum use of airspace while minimizing the risk of engagement by friendly air defense. Examples are minimum risk routes and standard-use Army aircraft flight routes and air corridors.
5-77. For TMD, capabilities dictate that ADA units engage enemy TMs based on classification, not identification. This enables ADA units that can classify targets as ASM or ballistic missiles to engage those threatening targets based on classification.
5-78. Airspace control measures afford commanders the means to control airspace use, protect ground operations or facilities, and control other users of the airspace. High-density airspace control zones and restricted operations zones are examples of supplemental fire control measures. Joint Pub 3-52, FM 100-103, and FM 100-103-1 provide further details.
5-82. For positive management, commanders consider the numbers and types of electronic means available. This will vary according to the depth of the battlefield. As operations move farther forward, available means for positive control decrease, necessitating additional procedural management.
5-83. Air traffic behind the division generally moves in ways that are normally well suited for positive control. Air defense is usually in a critical or static asset defense role in this area. In this area of the battlefield, positive control is easier to effect and is usually the preferred method.
5-84. Forward of the corps, the generally high volume of aircraft and friendly missiles can make positive control extremely difficult. Flexible and varying missions can also necessitate more reliance on procedural control.
5-85. The nature of the theater may also dictate what type of control is used. Mature theaters have elaborate and tested electronic management facilities in place. Contingency theaters may have no such systems in place and will rely more heavily on procedural control. As the lodgment area expands and additional assets arrive in the theater, a transition to positive control may take place.
5-88. Centralized control is essential to ensure integration and control of all air defense assets from the ADA brigade down to the ADA fire unit to maximize their collective effect on the battlefield. Centralized control also facilitates the synchronization of offensive and defensive operations within the Army and among all the participants in joint or multinational operations. In the case of Army ADA, centralized control is executed through compliance with theater ROE and AMD weapon control procedures and measures. Data integration and operational control complete the synchronization.
5-89. Decentralized execution is necessary because the number of activities associated with air defense operations prevents any one commander from effectively controlling all air defense forces and actions. Decentralized execution also enables air defense assets to maximize their individual capabilities and meet the extreme engagement time lines of air and missile threats. Thorough planning and coordination link centralized control and decentralized execution.
5-91. Air battle management is essential in an air environment that has large quantities of both enemy and friendly air users. Current weapon systems, although highly sophisticated, do not possess infallible identification technology. Therefore, the goal of air battle management is to control the engagement of air targets, ensuring the destruction of enemy aircraft and missiles while preventing fratricide and unnecessary multiple engagements.
5-92. Coordination is necessary to prevent interference among all airspace users. As a participant in air battle management, the AMDCOORD at each level of command ensures close coordination among all airspace users. Management of the air battle employs a mix of positive and procedural control measures.
5-95. Warning procedures and alert statuses alert, prepare, or cause units to build up for combat action. Most warning procedures and alert statuses have specific application for air and missile defense forces.
Table 5-3. HIMAD Weapons Alert Designators
| WAD | RTF | 5 min | 1 hr | 3 hr | 6 hr | RTM |
| A | ALL | |||||
| B | 60% | 20% | 20% | |||
| C | 40% | 20% | 20% | 20% | ||
| D | 30% | 20% | 20% | 20% | 10% | |
| E | 30% | 20% | 30% | 20% | ||
| F | 60% | 20% | 20% |
|||
| G | 50% | 20% | 30% | |||
| H | 30% | 20% | 20% | 30% |
||
| NOTE: x% = % of fire units. RTF = Ready to Fire. RTM = Ready to Move. | ||||||
Table 5-4. SHORAD Weapons Alert Designators
| WAD | RTF | 5 min | 15 min | 30 min | 1 (or more) |
| A | ALL | ||||
| B | 80% | 10% | 10% | ||
| C | 60% | 10% | 20% | 10% | |
| D | 40% | 20% | 20% | 20% | |
| E | 30% | 70% | |||
| NOTE: x% = % of fire unit at each readiness condition. RTF = Ready to Fire. | |||||
Table 5-5. HIMAD SOR/SOE Definition
| SOE 1 | BS, ABT (air breathing threat) |
| SOE 2 | BS, BM (ballistic missile) |
| SOE 3 | Battle Passive |
| SOR 4 | 5 min |
| SOR 5 | 1 hour |
| SOR 6 | 3 hours to assume SOE 1/2/3 |
| SOR 7 | 6 hours to assume SOE 1/2/3 |
| SOR 8 | Non-Mission capable status |
| SOR 9 | Unit moving, in transition, or reduced readiness battery (RRB) status |
| SOR 0 | Destroyed |
Table 5-6. SHORAD SOR/SOE Definition
| SOR 1 | The team is prepared to engage targets. |
| SOR 2 | The team is capable of engaging targets within 5 minutes. |
| SOR 3 | The team is capable of engaging targets within 15 minutes. |
| SOR 4 | The team is capable of engaging targets within 30 minutes. |
| SOR 5 | The team is capable of engaging targets within 1 hour or more. |
| SOE 1 | Radiating and sensor broadcast net (SBN) broadcasting. |
| SOE 2 | Prepared to radiate (radar operating but not emitting), SBN broadcasting. |
| SOE 3 | Prepared to radiate within 15 minutes, SBN broadcasting. |
| SOE 4 | Prepared to radiate within 30 minutes, SBN broadcasting. |
| SOE 5 | Prepared to radiate within 1 hour or more, SBN broadcasting. |
5-100. ADA commanders do not change the readiness posture of their units by changing the ADW, but instead raise or lower the WAD or SOR and SOE. The three ADW are as follows:
5-107. Weapons Free. Weapons can fire at any air target not positively identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive weapon control status.
5-108. Weapons Tight. Fire only at air targets that are identified as hostile according to the prevailing hostile criteria. Identification can be effected by a number of means to include visual identification (aided or unaided), electronic, or procedural means. Capabilities dictate that ADA units engage threatening ballistic missiles and ASMs based on classification, not identification.
5-109. Weapons Hold. Do not fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order. This is the most restrictive weapon control status.
5-110. There is no difference between weapons free and weapons tight for theater missile targets. Normally, ADA units will use weapons tight to allow theater missile engagements and do not use weapons free with respect to theater missile targets.
5-112. Engagement authority is delegated to the lowest level in SHORAD fire units. HIMAD fire units normally have engagement authority for theater missile engagements; however, the engagement authority for aircraft is normally at SADC or higher.
5-114. Centralized Control Mode. This mode is when a higher echelon authorizes target engagements to fire units. Permission to engage each track must be requested by the fire unit from that higher AD echelon. Centralized control is used to minimize the likelihood of engaging friendly aircraft while permitting engagements of hostile aircraft and missiles only when specific orders are issued to initiate the engagement. Normally, centralized control is used for HIMAD aircraft engagements.
5-115. Decentralized Control. This mode is the normal wartime mode of control for air and missile defense. A higher echelon monitors unit actions, making direct target assignments on a management by exception basis to units only when necessary to ensure proper fire distribution, to prevent engagement of friendly air platforms, and to prevent simultaneous engagements of hostile air targets. Decentralized control is used to increase the likelihood that a hostile aircraft or missile will be engaged as soon as it comes within range of an ADA weapon system. Normally, SHORAD engagements are decentralized. Normally, HIMAD theater missile engagements are decentralized.
5-116. Simultaneous Use of Both Modes. Control of engagement operations during the air battle may be centralized at a higher headquarters FDC or decentralized to a subordinate FDC. Centralized control and decentralized control can be executed simultaneously. For instance, in a situation where battle management has been decentralized to the ADA brigade FDC, the ADA brigade commander exercises centralized control of subordinate units. At the same time, however, higher control echelons are continuously monitoring the actions of the brigade. These higher echelons are exercising decentralized control while the brigade commander exercises centralized control. Thus, centralized control and decentralized control are conducted simultaneously.
5-119. Engage is used to order a unit to fire on a specific target. This order cancels any previous fire control order that may have been given on that target.
5-120. Cease engagement is used to stop tactical action against a specified target and is always followed by an engage command. This order may be used to change an ongoing engagement of one target to another of higher priority. Missiles in flight are allowed to continue to intercept. In NATO, this order may also be used to preclude simultaneous engagement of a target by more than one weapon system (does not apply to Patriot, see cease-fire).
5-121. Hold fire is an emergency fire control order used to stop firing. Missiles already in flight must be prevented from intercepting, if technically possible. This order may be used to protect friendly aircraft.
5-122. Cease-fire is given to ADA units to refrain from firing on, but to continue to track, an airborne object. Missiles in flight are allowed to continue to intercept. This command is used to prevent simultaneous target engagement by manned fighters and ADA units, or multiple ADA units.
5-123. Cover is used to order a fire unit to assume a posture that will allow engagement of a target if directed. For radar-directed systems, this means achieving a radar lock on a specified target. This order can be used for targets that are presently being engaged by another fire unit or for targets that have yet to become a significant threat. Units that receive this command report tracking, lock on, and ready to fire to higher echelons (does not apply to Patriot configuration-2; applies to Patriot configuration-3).
5-124. Engage hold (HIMAD only) is used to temporarily restrain a fire unit from automatically engaging a target. If the fire unit has not fired, target tracking continues. Missiles in flight are allowed to continue to intercept.
5-125. Stop fire is an emergency order to temporarily halt the engagement sequence due to internally unsafe fire unit conditions. It is seldom transmitted outside the fire unit. This command can by given by anyone in the fire unit who detects an unsafe condition. The engagement continues after the unsafe condition has been corrected.
5-128. Air Defense Action Area. This is an area and the airspace above it within which friendly aircraft or ADA weapons are normally given precedence in operations except under specified conditions. This type of ADOA is primarily used to minimize mutual interference between friendly aircraft and ADA weapon systems. ADOA which have been prioritized for ADA weapons are similar to restricted operations areas for aircraft, except that ADOA are normally in effect for longer periods of time.
5-129. Air Defense Area. This is a specifically defined airspace for which air and missile defense must be planned and provided. This type of ADOA is primarily used for airspace control, but may also be used to define any area within which ADA units are operating.
5-130. Air Defense Identification Zone. The air defense identification zone (ADIZ) is the airspace of defined dimensions within which the ready identification, location, and control of airborne vehicles are required. This type of area is normally used only for airspace control. Areas within an ADIZ will normally be characterized by extremely stringent hostile criteria and weapon control statuses.
5-132. ADA engagements within an activated WEZ can be conducted by the following regardless of the level of control, weapon control status, or hostile criteria in effect outside the activated WEZ:
5-133. Thus, an activated WEZ supplements ADA hostile criteria and is used by FDCs and fire units to make target assignments and engagement decisions. Commonly used WEZ are discussed in the following paragraphs.
5-134. Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). Established in an area where no effective surface-to-air capability is employed. The responsibility for engagement of air threats normally rests with fighter aircraft.
5-135. Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ). Volume of airspace which establishes control over engagements by HIMAD. A MEZ defines the volume of airspace within which these weapons can conduct engagements without specific direction from the authority establishing the WEZ.
5-136. Short-range Air Defense Engagement Zone (SHORADEZ). Area of SHORAD deployment that may fall within a MEZ. It is also possible that SHORAD assets may solely defend some areas. A SHORADEZ can be established to define the airspace within which these assets will operate. Because centralized control over short-range air defense weapons may not be possible, these areas must be clearly defined and promulgated so that friendly aircraft can avoid them.
5-137. Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ). Airspace of specified dimensions within which multiple air defense weapon systems (surface to air missiles and fighters) of one or more service components are simultaneously employed and operated.
5-141. Four common temporary airspace restrictions are: restricted operations areas, minimum risk routes, standard-use Army aircraft flight routes and air corridors, and sectors of fire and primary target lines. They are discussed in the following paragraphs.
5-142. Restricted Operations Area. Identifies airspace of defined dimensions within which the operation of one or more airspace users is restricted, generally for a short time. The airspace control authority establishes these areas in response to the requests of ground force commanders. Consequently, the maneuver unit commander will normally have complete weapon control status authority within an activated restricted operations area.
5-143. Restricted operations areas for air and missiles can be established to maximize ADA effectiveness. In such cases, the normal ADA weapon control status will be WEAPONS FREE.
5-144. Restricted operations areas for ADA can be established to maximize air effectiveness. In such cases, the normal ADA weapons control status will be WEAPONS HOLD.
5-145. Minimum Risk Route (MRR). Temporary corridor of defined dimensions passing in either direction through ADA defenses, a HIDACZ, or through a restricted operations area. It is designated to reduce risk to high-speed aircraft transiting the tactical operations area at low altitudes. The weapon control status for MRR will normally be maintained at WEAPONS TIGHT. Such circumstances will exist where there is inadequate timely control capability to permit a more flexible method of air defense. In such eases where friendly air does not use MRR, it is recognized that established AD procedures will apply. Low-level transit routes are the NATO equivalent of MRR.
5-146. The weapon control status for ADA fire units whose engagement ranges intercept an activated MRR remains at WEAPONS TIGHT for that part of the route. Should it become necessary to change to WEAPONS FREE, the commander who established it will close that particular route.
5-147. Standard-use Army Aircraft Flight Routes. Temporary air corridors of defined dimensions established below the coordinating altitude to allow the Army commander to safely route movement of aviation assets performing combat support and combat service support missions. They normally are located in the corps through brigade rear areas but may be extended to support logistics missions. Air corridors are restricted routes of travel specified for use by friendly Army aircraft and established to prevent friendly forces from firing on friendly aircraft.
5-148. The weapon control status for ADA fire units whose engagement ranges intercept an activated standard-use Army aircraft route or air corridor remains at WEAPONS TIGHT for that part of the route or corridor. Should it become necessary to change to WEAPONS FREE, the commander who established it will close that particular route. Procedures for deconfliction of friendly surface-to-surface missile firings and UAV operations can be found in Joint Pub 3-55.1 and FM 100-103-1.
5-149. Sectors of Fire and Primary Target Lines (PTL). PTLs are established to assist in the distribution of ADA fires. Sectors of fire for HIMAD are normally designated at battalion after review of radar coverage diagrams. The battery commander or platoon leader normally designates sectors of fire or PTLs for SHORAD. These limits must be clearly defined by right and left azimuths. Those ADA units with automated tactical data systems must know whether they are to assign and engage air targets within or beyond the stated sector boundaries.