This chapter addresses integration of the air defense combat function into planning and operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. ADA forces protect geopolitical assets and accomplish other missions assigned by the national command authority (NCA) at the strategic level. At the operational level, ADA forces protect the theater base, the ports of debarkation, and operational lines of communications. And at the tactical level of war, Army ADA supports the scheme of maneuver while protecting corps and division forces according to the maneuver commander's air and missile defense priorities.
6-2. Army air and missile defense requires the integrated application of all combined arms. For OCA and TMD attack operations, the Army uses deep operations, primarily by special operations forces, aviation and field artillery units, to attack the enemy's air and missile assets before they can be launched against the theater. Active DCA and TMD active defense operations conducted by Army forces are in response to immediate enemy air, missile, and surveillance threats. The Army's primary active DCA and TMD active defense force is ADA, which provides dedicated low-, medium-, and high-altitude air and missile defense systems. ADA and the other combined arms forces integrate their fires to protect the force and geopolitical assets and ensure freedom to maneuver.
6-6. Ground forces deploying in a force-projection operation may have little air support in the early entry stage of the operation. They may have to depend on the air and missile defense resources that deploy with the force. Force-projection operations are normally short-duration operations, but may transition to protracted war. In the initial stages of the force-projection operation, there will only be a few high-value assets. Counterair and theater missile defense forces must protect those assets to ensure the continued buildup and expansion of the lodgment area.
6-11. Air and missile defense objectives at the tactical level are an extension of the operational-level objectives, but are more specific. Tactical-level air and missile defense operations support the overall objectives of corps and divisions. The emphasis at the tactical level is on protecting the force rather than on gaining control of the air environment or protecting geopolitical assets. The following paragraphs discuss specific tactical objectives for ADA brigades and battalions:
6-14. Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information technology systems while defending one's own information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war. Information operations capitalize on the growing sophistication, connectivity, and reliance on information technology. IO targets information or information systems in order to affect the information dependent process, whether human or automated. Such information dependent processes range from national command authorities-level decision making to the automated control of key commercial infrastructures such as telecommunications and electric power.
6-15. Many different capabilities and activities must be integrated to achieve a coherent IO strategy. Intelligence and communications support is critical to conducting offensive and defensive IO. These assigned and supporting capabilities and activities include operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare (EW), physical attack and destruction, and may include computer network attack. Joint Publication 3-13 should be consulted for more information.
6-20. Tactical-level air and missile defense requires the integration of ADA units with other combined arms elements. Tactical-level air and missile defense is primarily the responsibility of ADA, but maneuver, fire support, aviation, and intelligence elements must participate directly. Logistics provides the means for all air and missile defense operations. Each participant has a specific role in tactical air and missile defense plans and operations. These integrated roles are mutually supporting.
Figure 6-1. Joint Force Commander's Air Defense Role
Joint Force Land Component Commander
6-30. The AMDCOORD works closely with the FSCOORD, G3, and G2 during the targeting process to prioritize OCA and TMD targets. The enemy's ability to disrupt friendly operations dictates target priority. The AMDCOORD makes target recommendations, weighing them against other requirements of the commander's plan competing for the same fire support. Many OCA and TMD targets fall into the category of deep targets. Therefore, long-range fire support assets are the optimal means to attack them.
6-32. Aviation can conduct attacks against OCA and TMD targets that cannot be effectively engaged by indirect fire systems. Army aviation also participates in air assault operations against OCA and TMD targets. The force commander plans air security and SEAD missions to support Army aviation deep strike OCA and TMD operations.
6-33. Army aviation participates in DCA operations primarily by attacking aerial targets of opportunity and by engaging enemy air targets in self-defense. However, the force commander may give Army aviation forces the mission to screen the force against RSTA UAVs. Other DCA operations conducted by Army aviation occur in response to specific air threats. Army aviation DCA goals are to provide self-defense and augment the air defense capability of the combined arms team on the ground. Air cavalry squadrons and attack helicopter battalions can fill gaps in the force's air defense when ADA units are redistributing assets and adjusting forces. Helicopters in an air combat role also can provide air defense during screening missions. Early warning provided by screening or attack aviation assets must be integrated into ADA early warning and vice versa.
6-34. Coordination between the aviation and ADA commanders is particularly important, as aviation forces must operate in the airspace within the ADA engagement coverage. Prevention of fratricide is a major element of force protection. Identification of on-order air defense missions for aviation occurs during the formulation of the commander's plan. The plan includes command relationships and detailed control measures for the employment of aviation in an air defense role.
6-36. The AMDCOORD coordinates with the G2 or S2 to ensure air and missile defense requirements are met after the identification of all PIR and IR during the planning phase. The G2's collection manager then ensures specific orders and requests fully support those requirements. The collection manager also synchronizes collection and reporting to deliver relevant information on time. This process involves the prioritization of scarce resources to meet many intelligence requirements (IR). A request for intelligence information is generated when organic assets cannot satisfy an IR. The focus of tactical intelligence could include forward operating bases, FARP, missile and UAV capabilities, electronic warfare systems, logistics facilities, and command and control nodes. The interface between the AMDCOORD and G2 or S2 is essential for many reasons including a coordinated and accurate evaluation of enemy air and missile capabilities.
Figure 6-2. JOPES Operational and Supporting Functions
6-48. Planners develop strategic end states tailored to the particular situation in war or conflict. The combatant commander modifies existing strategic and contingency plans and alters portions of the theater strategy using crisis-action planning. The theater strategy is written in terms of military objectives, military concepts, and resources. It provides guidance for a broad range of activities throughout the AO.
6-49. Commanders and staff conduct theater-strategic planning using the JOPES. The assigned planning requirements are formulated into a family of OPLANs to meet strategic and contingency requirements in the theater. The JFLCC develops the supporting plan as part of the family of plans. The commander's OPLAN is a theater campaign plan that integrates air, land, and naval operations to accomplish a common objective. Theater OPLANs are designed to achieve strategic goals. The commander uses operational art in theater design to influence the strategic intent found in both the theater strategy and campaign plan.
6-51. Planning and task organization occurs at all levels to ensure successful accomplishment of the mission once the DAL is published. EAC ADA brigades conduct defense planning and task organize forces to protect assigned assets from the DAL. ADA battalions continue to refine these plans and further task organizes to execute air and missile defense operations. Also, the TAAMDCOORD advises the COMARFOR/JFLCC on the employment of the corps ADA brigade to ensure integration into the theater air and missile defense plan. When necessary, corps commanders may be tasked to protect theater assets from the DAL located in the corps area using corps ADA forces.
6-52. Air and missile defense operations during deployment and entry operations are essential for force protection due to the vulnerability of deploying forces entering a theater. Forces are flowed into a theater based on the threat and the mission. The JFC may decide to initially deploy a robust air and missile defense capability into theater to protect the force prior to decisive operations. As operations progress the DAL is continually reassessed by all components and recommendations are forwarded to the JFC or JFACC/AADC.
6-54. Using JFC guidance the AADC develops the air and missile defense concept for the theater. The DAADC assists the AADC with the air and missile defense plan development. In the role of TAAMDCOORD, the DAADC, with input from the fire support element and the Army airspace command and control element, assists the JFLCC’s staff (J3 and J5) in providing recommendations on Army CA priorities, TMD priorities, and resource allocation to support the JFC’s air and missile defense concept.
6-55. When the AAMDC is in theater the AAMDC commander will normally be designated the DAADC and will be the principal integrator for the JFLCC to the AADC on air and missile defense plan development (figure 6-3). An AAMDC liaison team works closely with the AADC and his staff and the BCD to accomplish air and missile defense integration. The BCD air defense section coordinates its activities with the AAMDC LNO team. The BCD AD section may also augment the AAMDC LNO team as needed. The BCD accomplishes coordination when the AAMDC is not in theater, which locates part of its staff with the joint air operations center (JAOC). In the role of TAAMDCOORD the DAADC, with input from the fire support element, and Army airspace command and control cell, assists the JFLCC's staff (J3 and J5) in providing recommendations on Army CA priorities, TMD priorities, and resource allocation to support the JFC's air and missile defense concept.
Figure 6-3. AAMDC Intrgration with JAOC and BCD
6-57. The BCD is the JFLCC's representation in the USAF joint air operations center (JAOC). The JFLCC will establish a similar liaison arrangement if the JFACC is from the USN or USMC. The JFLCC organizes the BCD based on the type of theater and the JAOC organization. In force-projection operations involving only one corps, the corps commander will structure the BCD. The BCD provides JFLCC input into the air operations planning process. Army air and missile defense contributions are planned and coordinated through the AAMDC, EAC ADA brigade, corps, and division CPs. Refer to FM 100-13 and FM 100-13-1 for a more detailed discussion of the BCD.
6-58. The AADC develops the DCA portion of the plan and allocates assets for various missions. The JFLCC's TAAMDCOORD determines whether the corps has sufficient air and missile defense resources or if the JFLCC should allocate additional theater Army air defense assets for protection of the corps. The TAAMDCOORD may also recommend that the JFLCC allocate corps air and missile defense resources to protect theater assets. The TAAMDCOORD recommends to the JFLCC which assets Army ADA units can protect and which assets require other component or multinational coverage. In the absence of the DAADC when the AAMDC is not in theater, the senior ADA commander as the TAAMDCOORD integrates ADA units into the AADC's DCA planning process. However, this is normally a DAADC function because the AAMDC has the necessary personnel and equipment to deploy to the AADC's location to accomplish ADA integration.
6-59. The plan enables the JFLCC to finalize the air and missile defense and fire support portions of the land operation plan (figure 6-4). The JFLCC prioritizes the allocated CAS missions in coordination with fire support plans. The JFLCC's priorities are the foundation for interdiction targeting. The JFLCC's TAAMDCOORD develops the air and missile defense portion of the land operation plan.
Figure 6-4. Development of Air Defense and Fire Support Annexes
6-61. During the targeting process, the AMDCOORD, in conjunction with the G2, develops and recommends OCA and TMD targeting priorities and nominates OCA and TMD targets and target areas of interest (TAI). He then develops and recommends AD and TMD priorities to the commander for approval. The air liaison officer participates in this process by recommending SEAD targets to the FSCOORD.
6-62. The FSCOORD and the AMDCOORD incorporate the approved priorities into the fire support annex and the air and missile defense annex of the maneuver plan. The FSCOORD integrates OCA and TMD targets, targeting priorities, and TAIs into the force’s fire support plan. The AMDCOORD includes the DCA and TMD active defense priorities and associated IPB products in the development and coordination of the force's air and missile defense operation.
6-63. Coordination between AMDCOORD and FSCOORD ensures that the OCA, DCA, and TMD portions of the air and missile defense effort are complementary. The integration and synchronization of OCA and TMD attack operations by the AMDCOORD and FSCOORD prevents mutual interference and maximizes unity and economy of effort.
6-64. Coordination of OCA and TMD targets between the Army and the Air Force occurs at the AOC and the CRC. OCA, DCA, SEAD, and TMD plans are developed simultaneously and in concert, not as separate, isolated plans. The OCA, DCA, SEAD, and TMD plans are an integral part of the theater campaign plan and the maneuver plan at each Army echelon.
6-66. The AMDCOORD is a member of division and corps targeting boards and is represented in the deep operations coordination cell. He recommends OCA and TMD targets as fire support priorities and contributes to fire support planning. In addition, ADA contributes to TMD and OCA target location and identification through surveillance and back-plotting launch locations.
6-67. The force commander at each tactical echelon establishes OCA and TMD priorities in support of the concept. OCA and TMD targets are generally beyond the FLOT and include the following:
6-69. Most Army DCA, and all Army TMD, active defense tasks are assigned to ADA units. Army ADA units will be positioned tactically by the appropriate ground force commander in defense of critical assets relative to suspected threat approach avenues or azimuths. Because of their limited numbers, ADA resources are allocated based on specific air and missile defense priorities. The AAMDC provides the air and missile defense plan to the ARFOR or JFLCC plan. In the air and missile defense plan, EAC ADA brigades normally will protect priority assets from the CINC's defended asset list. Corps commanders may be tasked in the theater campaign plan to protect theater assets in the corps area using corps ADA forces. ADA commanders design defenses and task organize forces to protect designated priority assets. The air defense employment principles and guidelines in chapter 4 form the basis for the design of these defenses.
6-71. The AMDCOORD evaluates and recommends passive measures for incorporation into the maneuver commander's plans and SOPs. The AMDCOORD recommends measures that may deceive, frustrate, and surprise enemy air and surveillance assets. Some examples at the operational level are moving large units at night, developing an early warning system, creating large area smoke screens, and establishing emissions control (EMCON) procedures. Some examples at the tactical level are employing radar scattering camouflage, utilizing early warning instead of local sensors, and locating units on hardened sites.
6-73. The BCD is the JFLCC's representation in the USAF AOC. The JFLCC will establish a similar liaison arrangement if the JFACC is from the USN or USMC. The JFLCC organizes the BCD based on the type of theater and the AOC organization. In force projection operations involving only one corps, the corps commander will structure the BCD. The BCD provides JFLCC input into the air operations planning process. Army air and missile defense contributions are planned and coordinated through the AAMDC, EAC ADA brigade, corps, and division CPs.
6-75. The JICO cell supports continuous operations. Each service normally contributes personnel or expertise to the JICO cell to plan and execute joint operations. The AAMDC normally would provide the ARFOR or JFLCC expertise to the JICO cell to ensure integration of ARFOR air and missile defense operations with joint or multinational operations.
6-78. The sophistication, lethality, and numerical strength of the enemy in the mature theater are generally greater in contingency theaters. Prepositioned in a mature theater is a vast array of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, linked by an extensive battle command system. Depending on their location and echelon, these forces possess a wide variation in mobility and hardness. The enemy in a mature theater leaves little time for reaction. The rapid tempo of operations becomes the key factor in the analysis of time.
6-79. Contingency theaters may have no prepositioned forces. Contingency operations are generally of a smaller scale than operations in a mature theater. In contingency theaters, time is critical to the deployment and buildup of the forces. The time required to deploy, establish, and expand a lodgment affects the ability of the force to conduct operations.
6-80. METT-TC in close, deep, and rear operations is the foundation for ADA planning at the tactical level. This analysis is a function of position on the modern battlefield. The conduct of the analysis focuses on the type of operation to be conducted, the air threat expected, and the focus of the air threat.
6-81. Close operations involve forces that are extremely vulnerable to detection because of their proximity to the enemy. The primary air threat in this area is rotary-wing aircraft. ADA support of close operations focuses on the protection of the maneuver force by destroying enemy attack helicopters, UAVs, and CAS aircraft which penetrate the joint counterair force. Highly mobile and hardened systems best accomplish this mission.
6-82. Deep operations allow the force commander to shape the battlefield for future close operations. ADA planning for deep operations will be similar to that conducted for close operations. ADA forces are integrated into maneuver forces conducting deep operations and protect deep strike fire support assets. Highly mobile and hardened assets with a self-sustaining capability will best accomplish this mission. A proper mix of systems will provide ADA coverage at all altitudes and allow the force conducting deep operations the maximum freedom to maneuver.
6-83. Rear area air threats are predominantly UAVs, fixed-wing aircraft, and theater missiles with missions to destroy soft, immobile, high-value targets. These assets, which include aviation, C2, deep strike artillery, and logistics, are critical to corps and division operations. ADA planners deploy systems in rear areas that are less mobile, but have greater ranges to allow for early and multiple engagements.
6-84. The objective of ADA planning is to establish low- to high-altitude air and missile defense coverage of the maneuver commander's defense priorities. The ADA commander must ensure horizontal and vertical integration throughout the operational area. ADA operations require synchronization with the supported force and coordination with higher and lower ADA echelons and adjacent ADA units. This often includes the integration of Army ADA plans with joint counterair and TMD operations. The METT-TC process influences integrated air and missile defense planning from theater through battalion level and permits reinforcement of the synchronization process.
Figure 6-5. Intregrated Air and Missile Defense Planning
6-89. Forces require all-altitude protection from enemy surveillance and attacks in mature theaters. Forces in the mature theater are not homogeneous. At the division level, forces tend to be highly mobile and hardened. Their mission requires a maneuver orientation and highly mobile air defense forces. Divisional forces are particularly vulnerable during offensive missions such as deep operations beyond the FLOT. In cross-FLOT operations, enemy air defense may preclude friendly close air support (CAS). Therefore, the forward deployed ground forces in the division must depend primarily on ADA. To support the division during offensive missions, the corps commander may reinforce the divisional ADA battalion with high-to medium-altitude systems and, possibly, additional low-altitude systems.
6-90. Contingency theaters require ADA coverage for each stage of the operation. During the pre-deployment activities, analysis of the air threat identifies the air and missile defense requirements. In the deployment stage, ADA systems require lift to the area of operations to provide early air and missile defense protection of the POD, LOC, and lodgment area. ADA systems must deploy rapidly and in sufficient numbers to defeat the threat. During the entry stage, ADA counters enemy RSTA, air, and missile attack operations. Long-range DCA is normally the responsibility of Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force air assets, but ADA provides the only protection against TMs, UAVs, and helicopters. This multiservice air and missile defense requires integration of the ADA concept of operations into the joint counterair and TMD plans.
6-91. ADA must accompany the force, particularly in regions where large distances are traversed in a short period of time, during expansion of the lodgment. ADA systems must be highly mobile to provide the force the low- and medium-altitude protection required during rapid movement. Counter-RSTA remains an imperative. Employment of additional ADA strengthens the air and missile defenses at the lodgment area and the logistics base.
6-92. ADA shifts emphasis from counter-RSTA to force protection during the operations stage. The operation either terminates successfully or escalates into operations similar to those of an established theater. If escalation occurs, additional ADA must deploy and integrate with the ADA resources previously deployed to sustain air and missile defense operations.
6-93. Whether supporting close, deep, or rear operations, the ADA commander at all levels develops and refines the ADA concept of operations to achieve the objectives of all tactical-level air and missile defense planning. The ADA commander's objective is to provide the force with sustained, low- to high-altitude air and missile defense of priority forces and assets throughout the battlefield. When developing the concept of operations, the ADA commander considers the specific characteristics of the operation and the approved air and missile defense priorities. The commander also assesses the potential contributions of joint counterair, TMD, and non-ADA Army resources. After considering the individual and combined capabilities of all available ADA resources, the ADA commander effects the necessary coordination to integrate and synchronize their contributions with the supported force's concept of operations.
6-94. The ADA concept of operations in close operations focuses on the protection of the maneuver force and reserves. ADA protection is weighted toward the main effort. In close operations, ADA and other members of the combined arms team focus their air defense efforts on defeating enemy attack helicopters and UAVs while retaining the tactical flexibility to destroy attacking fixed-wing aircraft. The combination of ADA and combined arms fires significantly increases friendly force effectiveness. A result of this synergistic effect is that the force kills more enemy air, loses fewer systems, and gains greater freedom to maneuver.
6-95. ADA must maneuver with the force to provide low-altitude protective fires in deep operations. Overwatch ADA fires may come from supporting longer-range ADA resources. As in close operations, maneuver elements may also engage air threats with their organic weapons systems. The ADA commander must integrate supporting Air Force and Army aviation fires whenever possible. Air and missile defense assets may consist of only SHORAD systems and attack helicopters that the commander can employ rapidly against enemy air throughout the depth of operations. If enemy fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters are expected, then mobile ADA assets that can counter this mixed threat are crucial to the deep operation.
6-96. Rear area air and missile defense includes operations by both short range and high- to medium- altitude air defense systems throughout the battlefield. The size of the area, however, requires the weighting of ADA resources around those facilities and assets that the commander determines are most critical to the concept of operation. HIMAD forces protect priority forces and assets from attack by TMs and fixed-wing aircraft. Short range air defense is added to the highest priority forces and assets to screen against RSTA attempts, destroy cruise missiles or attacking fixed-wing aircraft, and to provide a mix of weapons systems. Major ports, railheads, airfields, assembly areas, and storage areas are assets normally requiring dedicated SHORAD protection. CAFAD employment is also a means of air defense protection in the rear where air defense systems are not available. In these areas, smoke screens can reduce the vulnerability of rear area facilities and might even be used for LZ and PZ denial.
6-97. Passive air defense actions reduce the effectiveness of the air threat. The extent of an asset's passive air defense efforts directly impacts on the vulnerability of that asset. Regardless of the type of theater or area of the battlefield, the ADA concept of operations always includes passive air defense measures. Based on the force commander's air and missile defense priorities, not all assets will receive dedicated ADA forces for protection. However, most assets will receive a degree of air and missile defense protection from coverage provided by higher echelon and adjacent ADA units. To enhance the protection available from this air and missile defense coverage, all elements must plan and employ passive air defense measures. Integrated active and passive air defense makes the air threat expend maximum resources with a minimum of success. Based on the threat and scheme of maneuver, assets may need support to enhance their passive air defense posture. All members of the combined arms team must integrate the support requirements for passive air defense into the prioritization of tasks for their forces.
6-98. Vulnerability of a friendly asset depends on the extent of signature reduction, concealment, hardening, and deception employed. Signature reduction makes the battle command asset difficult to locate and less subject to attack. Engineer units can increase the hardness of the battle command asset by constructing field fortifications. Even if the battle command asset is attacked, the site is less vulnerable. Establishing a decoy may result in enemy air threats attacking the wrong location.
6-100. Factors for assigning command or support relationships are battle command, unity of command, survivability, and sustainability. The appropriate command or support relationship provides ADA commanders the flexibility and authority to synchronize their forces vertically and horizontally. When determining command or support relationships, the ADA commander retains a unified internal chain of command. When considering the factor of survivability, the ADA commander analyzes the degree of risk to the ADA unit versus mission accomplishment. The final factor in determining the command or support relationship is sustainability of the ADA force. The commander must ensure each unit will receive all required logistical support. Failure to consider these four factors when assigning a unit's command or support relationship will degrade the integrated ADA coverage of the force and threaten freedom to maneuver. The finalized ADA plan integrates task organization and command or support relationships with the ADA concept of operations.
6-105. Communications systems interface tactical-level ADA units with higher, lower, adjacent, and joint headquarters. These link the detection, acquisition, identification, and destruction or disruption tasks at all echelons. In this manner, communications and intelligence systems enhance integration, decision-making, maneuver, and target engagement for ADA operations. The type of theater, location on the battlefield, and the concept of operations determines communications architecture. The total integration of ADA operations in support of close, deep, and rear operations requires timely battle command capable of rapidly collecting critical information and distributing it in concise, usable form to leaders, planners, and weapons systems.
6-107. Planning for ADA operations must include six sustainment functions. They are manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems. The functions center on the care, maintenance, and use of all personnel and equipment essential to the unit in accomplishing its combat mission. These functions include such diverse responsibilities as maintaining the strength and spirit of the fighting force and, when necessary, decontaminating personnel and equipment. Logistics packages integrated into the supported force logistics system is the most common approach to use. Chapter 7 has more detailed discussions on logistics.
6-109. ADA forces take advantage of rapid maneuver, terrain, cover, and concealment to increase their survivability in close and deep operations. ADA systems maneuvering with the force derive a certain degree of protection from the maneuver force.
6-110. Some ADA systems in the rear can be hardened to increase survivability. Others take advantage of mobility, cover, concealment, terrain features, and collective protection to enhance survivability.
6-112. Due to the political and military aspects of the threat, TMD objectives are often strategic in nature. These include deployment for stability and support operations and defense of geopolitical assets. Defense of early entry forces and lodgments can also be strategic objectives since US forces are extremely vulnerable during these stages and US political support for operations must be kept at the highest levels possible.
6-113. All service components have the capability to make critical TMD contributions. The Army’s contribution is derived from four specific Department of the Army functions contained in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.1.
6-114. The DA functions are as follows:
6-115. The Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) is the Army’s combat organization for planning, coordinating, integrating, and executing TMD operations in support of the army service component commander (ASCC), the Army forces (ARFOR) commander, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC), if designated, and the JFC’s joint TMD fight. See FM 44-94 for detailed information on AAMDC organization and operations.